The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia by Hudson, Geoffrey Stephen
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1990 
The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia 
Geoffrey Stephen Hudson 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hudson, Geoffrey Stephen, "The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia" (1990). Honors 
Papers. 578. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/578 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 
By Geoffrey Hudson 
Geoffrey Hudson 







CHAPTER ONE Prologue: The Roots of American Commitment. 14 
Notes 26 
CHAPTER TWO Oil Diplomacy in the 1920's. 28 
Notes 76 
CHAPTER THREE The Rise of Military and Security Concerns. 86 
Notes 113 










American interests in Southeast Asia have received ample 
soholarly attention in the wake of the Vietnam War. Much of this 
material seeks to understand how policies in the first post-war 
years led to American military involvement in Vietnam. A sizable 
body of work is also devoted to U.S. policy in Indonesia in its 
first years of independence. But very few of these studies trace 
i 
A~erican interests in the region before 1940. Previous concerns 
for Southeast Asia are usually summed up in a few sentences that 
dismiss them as minor commercial interests of private companies. 
However, the development of American policy in Southeast Asia was 
not as sudden as these studies suggest. Since the late nineteenth 
century, the United States had become increasingly concerned with 
Southeast Asia. The process was a gradual one, but in no way did 
America's interest in the region start fresh in 1945. Several 
~ 
largescale continuities in American policy in Southeast Asia 
during the first half of the twentieth century can be observed. 
I 
First among these was a gradual and ongoing expansion of 
i 
Udited States interests in the region, American involvement 
through the mid-nineteenth century was limited principally to 
trade in spices and a few other non-essential commodities. 
American exports to Southeast Asia were relatively unimportant. 
Then, in the late nineteenth century, American trade with South-
east Asia began to expand. Southeast Asia took on a new signifi-
3 
cance as a market for American manufactures. By th1 1920's. 





concern for the region as a supplier of vital 
! 
oil and rubber resources of the Netherlands 
East Indies were of special concern to the United States. Within 
ten years, however, miltary and security concerns gradually 
supplanted these economic interests. For the first time, events 
in Southeast Asia became an important strategic issue for the 
United States. After World War II, American policy entered a new 
era. While economic and security concerns continued no factor 
into American policy decisions in Southeast Asia after ~945, they 
were subordinated to larger ideological questions like the future 
of the European colonial empires and the spread of communism. 
Thus, United States objectives in Southeast Asia moved 
from the comparatively minor economic goals of the Open Door to 
concern for the most important ideological issues of the day. The 
gradual expansion of American interests corresponds to Stephen 
Krasner's categorization of general U.S. diplomatic objectives. 
American officials had three basic aims in iqter-
national raw materials markets: increasing competjjtive 
economic behavior. insuring security of supply,j and 
furthering broader foreign policy objectives. In order 
of increasing importance, they consistently ranked them 
in the following way: 1) increase competition; 2) 
insure security of supply; 3) promote broad foreign 
policy objectives. (l) 
The evolution of American diplomatic objectives in Southeast Asia 
paralleled this analysis. Until the early years of the twentieth 
4 
centur~, United States Southeast Asian policy focused on free 
compet~tion in regional markets (the Open Door); this era corres-
ponds with Krasner's least important category, that of "in-
creasiQg competitive economic behavior", Beginning in the 1930's, 
however, purely economic interests gave way to concern for 
insuring the security of future imports of raw materials from the 
Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina to the United 
States. This stage parallels the second level in Krasner's 
analysis, "insuring stability of supply", After the Second World 
War, the critical issues for American diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
were the questions of colonialism and the Communist Menace, Thus, 
by 1945, American interests in the region had risen to the level 
rated ~ighest in Krasner's analysis: "promotion of broad foreign 
policyobjecti ves". 
Not surprisingly, the growth of American interests in 
Southeast Asia was coupled with increased official participation. 
The U.S. position in Southeast Asia in the early twentieth 
century is ~ best described as near total non-involvement. While 
there were a few Foreign Service officers in the region, American 
diplomatic activity was rare. As U.S. commercial interests in 
Southeabt Asia expanded, however, the diplomatic staffs also 
I 
grew, Greater commitment of personnel resulted in increased 
diplomatic correspondence from Southeast Asia; this fresh supply 
of information, in turn, promoted still more American interest in 
the region. Commercial attaches sent to the Netherlands East 
Indies to report on possible markets for American goods, returned 
5 
to Washington with information on mining and manufacturing oppor-
tunities as well. 
The range of policies open to United States diplomats 
also widened dramatically. The low grade American commitmeAt to 
Southeast Asia in the early twentieth century meant that U.S. 
diplomats working in the area had little leverage. Given the lack 
of American interest in the region, Foreign Service officers 
could do little more than politely express their wishes to local 
officials with scant hope of any action to support their posi-
tion. Even as American interests grew, Washington was slow to 
change. During negotiations with the Netherlands concerning op-
portunities for 
State Department 
American oil companies in the East Indies, the 
showed great reluctance to take retaliatory 
measures against the Dutch. The question of embargoes on sales of 
war materiel to Japan before World War II was another example of 
American hesitancy to enact any unprecedented policy. In general, 
the State Department was slow to take any new action in Southeast 
Asia; despi~e this consistent reluctance, however, US policy in 
the region did gradually become more active. American diplomatic 
efforts in Southeast Asia were further strengthened by the growth 
of the U.S. military presence in the region during the 1940's. 
Until 1945, American military weakness in the Pacific had placed 
strict limits on the range of policies open to the United States. 
After World War II, however, American military strength in 
Southeast Asia allowed a far greater range of policy options. To 
summarize, a slow growth in the willingness and capability of the 
6 
i 
American government to act in Southeast Asia is discernible. 
i 
The second general trend in American policy in Southeast 
Asia was that decisions were consistently affected more by 
, 
I 
developments outside of the region than within. Throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century, events in Southeast Asia did 
not factor in American policy decisions; the region was only an 
object upon which policy was enacted. The extra-regional concerns 
which shaped U.S. policy in Southeast Asia included not only the 
domestic situation in the United States, but also developments 
elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe and Japan. 
The quick rise and fall of American oil diplomacy in the 
early 1920's demonstrated this trend. Following the First World 
War, the United States embarked upon an aggressive pro¥ram to aid 
American oil companies abroad. State Department assistance to the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in the Netherlands East Indies 
was a central component of this intiative. Within a few years, 
however, new oil reserves were discovered at home and the 
diplomatic effort was curtailed, long before attaining its goals 
in the East Indies. Domestic considerations also dictated Ameri-
can policy during the Depression when the Roosevelt administra-
i 
tion sacrificed international objectives in order to ~oncentrate 
on resolving domestic chaos. 
Events in Europe were also important consid~rations in 
American policy for Southeast Asia. On the one hand, this is 
hardly surprising given that both the East Indies and Indochina 





ther~fore natural that Amerioan representations about Southeast 
I 
Asia! were made in Europe. On the other hand, however. the impaot 
I 
of turopean oonsiderations on polioy in Southeast Asia went far 
deep¢r. It was not just the 0010nia1 status of Southeast Asia 
that involved Europe in U.S. deoisions. Instead, European events 
shaped the oontent and form of Amerioan po1ioy. Muoh of the 
inoreased interest in Southeast Asia during the 1930's was a 
refleotion of Amerioan oonoern for the European oolonial powers. 
A State Department report from the early 1940's oonoluded that 
"it . is not apparent that there was any marked inorease of 
Amerioan diplomatio interest [in Southeast Asia] until... the 
fear of an axis-dominated world foroed the United States to 
oanvass every possible point of resistanoe and support." (2) 
Washington consistently gave greater priority to its programs in 
Europe. After World War II, the United States saorifioed its 
objectives of deoolonization in Southeast Asia in the interests 
of building a stronger Europe. 
While it is not surprising that events in America and 
Europe dominated minds in Washington, it is striking that rel-
atively little consideration was given to the impact of American 
, 
POli~y in Southeast Asia on Southeast Asia. As U.S. involvement 
in Southeast Asia increased, this failure to understand internal 
conditions in the region would become far more important. It was 
of little concern to Indonesians whether or not the State 
Department supported Standard Oil of New Jersey in the 1920's; 
twenty years later, however, the American stance on colonialism 
8 
I 
had a significant impact on the region. The expansion ~f 
I 
interests in Southeast Asia was not matched by a broadehing 
i 






domestic and European concerns, without much insight into the 
impact of its decisions on Southeast Asia. 
The third important continuity in U.S. Southea~t Asian 
policy was a consistent lack of long range vision. ~merican 
involvement in the region was sporadic and reactive. Th~re was 
little sense of what America's longterm interests in the' region 
, 
were. Washington formed policies for Southeast Asia pnly in 
[ 




quickly slackened after a brief flurry of activity, I 
Even during relatively "active" periods of U.S.' engage-
ment in the region there was little consideration of ~ongterm 
objectives. Instead, American policy focused on solving the 
specific problem of the day. In the 1920's, this meant that 
American diplomats equated the Open Door in the Netherlands East 
Indies with'the success of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Therefore, 
when Jersey Standard won concessions, the State Department ac-
cepted this as evidence of the Open Door; as a result, tpe U.S. 
I , 
I 
discontinued its pressure on the Dutch government even tpough a 
! 
careful examination of the East Indian situation woukd have 
revealed continued discrimination against other American oil 
companies. 
This failure to adequately prepare for the future was 
also visible during the war. Between Pearl Harbor and V~J Day, 
9 
the United States concentrated all of its energl;es on winning the 
i 
war. Although American officials did discuss the difficult issues 
that would confront postwar Southeast Asia, the~ avoided any firm 
decisions on the subject. 
Before proceeding further, it seems Iwise to briefly 
outline the structure of what follows. The thesis is divided into 
four sections, each treating a specific time period: the roots of 
American involvement before 1918; the "oil diplomacy" of the 
1920's; strategic concerns beginning in the mid-1930's and con-
tinuing through World War II; and planning for ~he post-war world 
after 1945. Each chapter represents a distinct :era in American 
relations with Southeast Asia. 
A brief prologue covers events from the mid-nineteenth 
century until 1918. American interests during this period were 
almost exclusively economic and involved little official govern-
ment activity. 
Chapter two covers the period between the end of World 
t 
War I and the mid-1930's. 1919 marked an important change in 
United States interests in Southeast Asia. After the end of the 
war, the State Department became actively invol vi,ed in the efforts 
I 
of American oil firms abroad. Using the prindiple of the Open 
Door, the United States tried to secure foreign oil concessions 
for American companies. The Netherlands East Indies were one 
focal point of these policies. The second chapter presents first 
a brief summary of American oil diplomacy around the world and 
then an extensive account of the specific events in the East 
10 




the mid-1930's until 1945. In the 1930's, American policy ~oved 





new concern for security objectives in Southeast Asia. It is 
difficult to pinpoint an exact beginning to this new stage in 
i 
American policy, due in part to the considerable overlap in the 
! 
objectives of the twenties and thirties. The turning poin~ is 
i 
further obscured by the fact that in the early thirties there was 
very little American policy towards Southeast Asia at i all. 
i 
Despite considerable overlap between the policies of this and the 
I 
! 
previous era, they are separated by fundamental differences.! The 
economic priorities of the 1920's were clearly reduced to secon-
I 
dary importance in the 1930's; American interests now center~d on 
the military and strategic importance of Southeast Asia. 
The fourth chapter presents an analysis of the Ametican 
search for a post-World War II order in Southeast Asia. The 
central 
~ 
concerns of this era were the fate of the European 
colonial empires and the rise of communism in the region. 
Discussion of these issues began before the end of the wart but 
no firm decisions were reached. Chapter four, therefore, 





settlement in Southeast Asia. Thus, there is some temporal 
overlap between the military/security concerns of the last qhap-








Th~ first ohapters of the thesis deal almost exclusively 
the Netherlands East Indies. This reflects American inter-
I 
of t~e time. U.S. concern for Indochina developed substan-
tially later; primarily because the French colony did not offer 
the economic temptations that lured Americans to the Netherlands 
East Indies. American interests expanded to include Indochina in 
the 1930's; the increased scope of the study in chapter three 
I 
reflects that development. 
At;this point, a brief word on the geographic focus of 
the thesis is in order. Southeast Asia commonly denotes a larger 
area than what this thesis focuses on. While the definition of 
Southeast Asia is somewhat flexible, it is accepted to inolude 
Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Portuguese Timor, and Brunei. (3) The 
research for this thesis, however, was limited to the Netherlands 
East Indies and French Indochina. The Philippines were not 
~ 
included because they were an American territory and, hence, not 
a fit comparison for European colonies in the area. Thailand was 
similarly iexcluded beoause it remained an independent state, 
, , 
I 
never comiqg under the control of a European power. Due to time 
, 
I 
constraints, British Malaya and Singapore were omitted from the 
study. It' seems unlikely, however, that their inclusion would 
have had significant impaot. American interests in the British 
possessions in Southeast Asia were almost identical to U.S. 
concerns for the East Indies and Indochina. 
12 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PROLOGUE: The Roots of American Commitment. 
The earliest' American concerns in Southeast Asia were 
economic. Throughout most of the nineteenth century. American 
business interest in the region was limited to trade in raw 
materials for export to the United States. In the last thirty 
I 
years of the old c~ntury. however, Southeast Asia emerged as a 
I 
potential market for American manufactures. 
I 
Both export and 
, 
import interests were essentially limited to the Netherlands East 
Indies. Outside of the Dutch colony. the only discernible Ameri-
can involvement was missionary work. None of these activities 
, 
involved significant I government action; the American presence in 
Southeast Asia included relatively little official support until 
the early years of the twentieth century. 
American involvement in Southeast Asia originated shortly 
$ 
after 1790 when U.S. merchants began to work the Sumatran pepper 
trade. Although Americans had a virtual monopoly on this trade 
within thirty year~, the total dollar value was never signifi-
I 
cant. The East Indie~ were also an important stopping point for , 
American ships bound for Canton. Ships that rounded the Cape of 
Good Hope, crossed the Indian Ocean, and passed through the Sunda 
Strait often called on East Indian ports to reprovision. (1) 
In addition to spices, the Netherlands East Indies of-
fered American traders a wide variety of other agricultural 
14 
products like tobacco. sugar, and coffee for import to the United 
States. (2) Sugar and coffee were the most important of these 
products accounting for approximately ninety percent of all 
American-East Indian trade. (3) Sumatran coffee was particularly 
well-regarded and highly sought after in American markets of the 
nineteenth oentury. In the 1880's and '90's, Americans imported 
between four and six million dollars worth of Indonesian tobacco 
each year. Other less important commodities included rattan, 
nutmeg, tea, and various natural dyes. (4) 
The United States also imported tin from the Netherlands 
East Indies, As early as 1832, Americans imported $64,000 worth 
of tin. This trade had grown to nearly one million dollars 
annually by the turn of the century. (5) Throughout this period, 
however, the bulk of American tin imports came from Bolivia. The 
United States did not rely heavily on supplies from Southeast 
Asia. 
On the whole, American imports from Southeast Asia re-
t 
mained relatively insignificant. Compared with American totals, 
trade with the Netherlands East Indies never exceeded .5% of 
imports and .1% of exports. (6) The fact that American-East 
Indian tra~e dealt mostly in luxury goods further reduced the 
significance of Southeast Asia in American eyes. The products 
that the United States obtained in Southeast Asia were not vital 
to the American economy. 
During most of the nineteenth century, American traders 




British and Dutch concerfs enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the 
region. The situation phanged, however, in the 1860's with the 
introduction of American! petroleum products into Southeast Asian 
markets. Petroleum's chief value in the nineteenth century was as 
kerosene for household i~lumination. American oil companies domi-
nated the international kerosene industry. Most of the oil in the 
world was produced in th~ United States and more than half of all 
American kerosene production between 1870 and 1900 was exported. 
Given the importance of export markets to American kero-
sene producers, U.S. oili interests, in particular John D. Rocke-
feller's Standard Oil,: began to look abroad for markets. The 
huge, untapped Asian market gleamed like a beacon for American 
! 
oilmen. Drawn by the thought of millions of Asians sitting in the 
dark, the U.S. began kerosene exports to Southeast Asia soon 
after the Civil War. Sales of kerosene to the Netherlands East 
Indies grew rapidly. The first shipments arrived in 1864; in 
1866, a total of 42,230 gallons of American kerosene was sold. 
Two years later, sales had increased more than tenfold to 457,792 
gallons. Throughout the 1870's, American exports of kerosene to 
the East Indies grew ste~dilYJ although not spectacularly, reach-
ing 800,000 gallons in ~882. In the early 1880's the volume of 
sales took another dramatic leap forward. By 1886 the total had 
reached 10,500,000 gallons, a more than thirteen-fold increase in 
just four years. By 1890, kerosene sales had doubled once again. 
reaching 22,340,000 gallons. (8) 
American oil companies enjoyed a virtual monopoly on 
16 
kerosene sales in the Netherlands East Indies until the late 
1880's. Although there were other kerosene producers, the Ameri-
cans had the advantage of reliable. leak-proof containers. These 
were sturdy wooden cases which enclosed two five-gallon cans of 
kerosene. The empty containers were employed throughout the 
Indies for storage and were cut up and used to make a wide 
variety of tools. American kerosene packing cases were so preva-
lent in the Indies that one Dutch observer in the early 1920's 
noted half-seriously that "the colony could not have been de-
veloped without oil cans." (9) 
The late nineteenth century boom in American kerosene 
exports sparked interest in developing new sources of oil. As the 
petroleum industry became more lucrative, businessmen around the 
world scrambled to enter the field. The Netherlands East Indies 
were an obvious candidate for eA~loration. Knowledge of oil 
deposits in Sumatra dated back at least 1,000 years and there 
were many places in the Indies where oil actually oozed from the 
~ 
ground. (10) Thus, it is hardly surprising that prospecting for 
oil fields began in the East Indies almost immediately after the 
first American kerosene sales in the region. As early as 1871, 
only eight years after the first imports of American kerosene, 
Dutch oil interests were actively searching for oil fields in the 
East Indies. (11) The first commercially viable oil deposits were 
discovered in Sumatra in 1885. These findings served as the 
foundation for one of the great international petroleum compa-
nies, the Royal Dutch group. (12) 
17 
I 
Amerioan entrepreneurs were also interested in the poten-
! 
I 
tial oil wealth of the East Indies. 'nhe most persistent of th.se 
i 
Amerioan interests was the Standard Oil Company. Beginning in the 
early 1890's; Standard sought to dstab1ish itself in the oil 
fields of the Dutch colony. At first, Standard attempted to buy 
concessions from other companies already active in the Indies. 
This tactic included offers in 1892, and again in 1895, to 
purchase outright the fledgling Royal Dutch. These transactions, 
however, were frequently blocked by the Dutch colonial govern-
ment. Standard Oil then began independent explorations, in the 
hopes of developing its own concessions. (13) Although Standard 
Oil's early efforts in the Indies met with little success, the 
company continued to pursue oil concessions there through the 
early years of the twentieth century. {14) A more detailed 
examination of these efforts will be postponed until the next 
chapter. 
Standard Oil's interest in East Indian oil did not stem 
from a sh@rtage of domestic supplies. American oil production 
continued to dominate the world industry through the first 
decades of the twentieth century. American fields accounted for 
I . 
more than s ixty-fi ve percent of al:1 crude all 
1930. (15) American desire for sout'beast Asian 
i 
produced before 
oil was based on 
two considerations. First, it was seen as a way of providing fuel 
for the expanding Asian market at lower cost. Kerosene produced 
in the Netherlands East Indies could be sold at more competitive 
prices because of reduced shipping costs. This concern became 
18 
inoreasingly important as Royal Dutoh and other oompanies ex-
panded their production capabilities in the East Indies. Second 1 
the oil of the Netherlands East Indies was of extremely high 
quality by the standards of the day. It required less refining 
than other crudes; this, too, made it potentially more profitable 
than kerosene exported from the United States. (16) 
The growth of oil prospecting in the Netherlands East 
Indies developed a second important market for American goods in 
Southeast Asia. Oil producers in the region purchased their 
drilling equipment and other mining supplies from American firms. 
The first oil well in the Indies was drilled with an American-
built rig. (17) Sales of drilling equipment and other heavy 
industrial products related to oil extraction eclipsed kerosene 
as America's largest export to the East Indies in 1915. Even into 
the 1920's, Royal Dutch Shell remained dependent upon American-
made extracting equipment. (18) It is worth noting that oil 
companies, and Standard Oil in particular, already dominated 
~ 
American interests in Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth 
century. Standard's dual concerns of kerosene sales and oil 
exploration in the Netherlands East Indies would continue to be a 
crucial factor in U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia for years to 
come. 
U.S. commercial interests in Southeast Asia were confined 
mostly to the Netherlands East Indies. Although Americans had 
been in Vietnam as early as 1820, (19) American trade with the 
French colony was slow to develop. Indochina offered neither the 
19 









markets as the 
Netherlands East Indies. The spices which first lured Yankee 
traders to the Dutch colony did not grow ih Indochina. Coffee and 
sugar, which made up the bulk of U.S.-E~st Indies trade before 
I 
the kerosene boom, were also not produced: in signigicant quanti-
ties in Indochina. Nor was there much potential for oil produc-
, 
tion; as of 1918, there were no known petroleum deposits in 
, 
Indochina. (20) The only mineral resource produced in large 
quantity in Indochina was coal. By the l~te nineteenth century, 
i 
I 
however, the importance of coal was ob the wane. Within ten 
years, most of the major navies of the wotld, including that of 
the United States, switched from coal to oil powered fleets. (21) 
Thus, none of the raw materials which drew! American merchants to 
the Netherlands East Indies were present in French Indochina. 
Indochina did not develop as a market for American 
industrial goods primarily because French colonial policy en-
forced tigh~ economic ties with the metropolis. High tariffs were 
placed on all imports into French colonies, effectively prohibit-
ing the sale of non-French goods. (22) A further impediment to 
i 
American-Indochinese trade was the absenc¢ of direct shipping 
\ 
lines from the United States to Indoc~ina; regular steamship 
service from America's Pacific coast to Indochina was not estab-
lished until the late 1920's. (23) In addition, the French 
restricted the development of manufacturing in Indochina. The 
French colonial administration relegated Indochina to the role of 
a producer of raw materials for manufacturing interests in the 
20 
!met.ropolis. (24) This eliminated the possibility of sales of 
iAmerican industrial machinery to Indochina. (25) 
American economic int.erests in French Indochina lagged 
far behind those in the Netherlands East Indies. This imbalance 
,was due t.o differences bot.h in the colonial pol icies of France 
and the Netherlands and the natural resources available in t.he 
two colonies. Yankee traders were not the only Americans active 
in Sout.heast. Asia, however; the int.repid entrepreneurs were 
joined by their more religious cousins, the hardy missionaries. 
Although most. of the task of christ.ianizing Southeast. 
iAsia fell to t.he Net.herlands and France as the colonial rulers, 
American missionaries were active in Southeast Asia throughout 
the nineteenth century. In 1833, two representatives of the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions arrived in 
Bat.avia. Their success, however, was limited, largely due to the 
fact that they were killed and eaten by Bataks shortly after 
their arrival. Later in the nineteenth century, the Methodist 
Episcopal Church established more enduring missions in Java and 
Sumatra. In the 1890's, both the Seventh Day Adventist.s and t.he 
palvation Army sent. missionaries t.o t.he Netherlands East Indies. 
, 
I 
~he latter organization was part.icularly successful, quickly 
spreading throughout Java and onto other islands as well. (26) As 
in the economic sphere, American missionary activity in Indochina 
lagged behind that in t.he East. Indies. Because American mission-
aries were almost invariably Prot.estant, t.hey met with some 
resist.ance from Catholic French officials. Nonetheless, by the 
21 
early 1900's, both the Christian and Missionary Alliande and the 
I 
i 
Plymouth Brethren had established missions in Indochina. (27) 
American involvement in Southeast Asia in the inineteenth 
! 
century, both religious and economic, was almost entir~lY limited 
to the activities of private individuals. Although 'the United 
States established consulates throughout Southeast Asia during 
the nineteenth century, there was little sustained official 
involvement in the affairs of Americans there. Against this 
background of general indifference, however, the first signs of 
i 
U.S. government interest in Asia as a whole were visible. A few 
isolated incidents of official American involvement in Ithe region 
are perhaps worth noting. 
In 1830, natives of the northwest coast of Sumatra 
attacked the American pepper ship E~~~hi~. In response, the 
United States sent the frigate fQtQmaQ to Sumatra to punish the 
natives. (28) This incident had no longterm impact. It was the 
only instan~e of American military involvement in Southeast Asia 
until the outbreak of World War II. American naval strength was 
not considered sufficient to enable action in Southeast Asia. In 
the 1880's, American diplomats served as mediators i~ the Sino-
French dispute over control of Annam. (29) Although tJe American 
I 
role was largely passive, it did represent a departure from the 
normal course of non-involvement in the affairs of the region. 
These instances were, however, anomalies in official American 
interest in Southeast Asia and did not manifest any ongoing and 
coherent U.S. policy in the region. 
22 
The a~nnexation of the 
I 
Ameri¢an oommitment to Southeast 
Philippines in 18B8 marked a ~ew 
Asia. Historians have debated 
wheth,r U.S. aoquisition of the Philippines was an unforeseen 
windfall of the Spanish-Amerioan war or a oarefully plotted move. 
I 
! 
The argument oan be made both ways. Certainly, there is evidence 
that top level American leaders gave the Philippines little 
consideration in contemplating the move to war. On the other 
hand, the record shows that Admiral Dewey's great victory at 
Manila was not completely unexpeoted; before the war started, 
Assis~ant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt had instructed 
Dewey:to sieze Manila upon the outbreak of hostilities. Whatever 
the degree of premeditation involved in the military seizure of 
the Philippines, the subsequent annexation of the islands marked 
an important turning point in American involvement in Southeast 
Asia. For the first time, the United States commitment entailed 
prolonged military and political involvement. This greater ex-
penditure 9f resources could not help but focus Washington's 
attention on a hitherto distant part of the globe. 
The American administration of the Philippines brought 
closet ties with all of Southeast Asia. The annexation offered 
I 
Ameriqan merchants new economic opportunities in the Philippines. 
In addition, U.S. commercial interests established branch offices 
in the islands, providing a base for increased American opera-
tions throughout Southeast Asia. The eA~erienoe of ruling the 
Philippines, in particular the guerilla war of 1899-1901, made 
Americans truly aware of the nationalist aspirations of South-
23 
east Asia for the first time. 
However, the acquisition of the Philippines did not 
trigger an unreserved American commitment to Southeast Asia. the 
U.S. attitude towards its new ward remained ambivalent long af~er 
i 
the debate over annexation itself had ended. Recurring doubts 
, 
plagued American leaders. In the face of Aguinaldo's fie~ce 
resistance to the imposition of U.S. rule, many Americans qu~s-
tioned whether the undertaking threatened liberal democratic 
ideals. Others worried that the United States had over-extended 
itself. Less than ten years after the annexation, Theod~re 
I 
Roosevelt, one of the most ardent American imperialists, called 
the Philippines the "achilles heel" of U.S. defenses. (30) Thus, 
annexation of the Philippines should not be seen as the beginning 
I 
of an unwavering and inexorable exPansion of American involvement 
in Southeast Asia. The process continued only hesitantly and with 
frequent reversals. The first two decades of the twentieth 
century wete one such instance. The bold advance of American 
interests in Southeast Asia after 1898 soon lagged. American 
attention, so far as it went abroad at all, focused on events in 
Latin America and China. 
By 1918, then, Southeast Asia had moved from beinJ a 
i 
place of interest only to spice traders and missionaries to a new 
position as a substantial trading partner of the United States. 
The Netherlands East Indies was of particular interest to Ameri-
cans, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for 
I 
American goods. It is difficult, however, to write of United 
24 
I 
States dipldmacy on Southeast Asia before 1918. There was, as 
I 
yet, little lofficial involvement in the region. 
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1.27 
Oil Diplomacy in the 1920's. 
i 
! 
In ths ~£ts~m~th Q£ ths Fi~at WQ~ld W~rJ American ~olicy 
in Southeast Asia underwent profound changes. The region, par-
ticularly the Netherlands East Indies, assumed a new and unprece-
dented importance for the United States. Whereas previous Ameri-
j 
tH:;'\>I bscame an object of concern for the United States government. 
I 
At the heart of this new interest in Southeast Asia was a g~owing 
1 
i 
awareness of the importanoe of foreign oil fields. A desi~e to 
assure American access to the natural resources of the Nether-
lands East Indies became the dominant consideration in Ame:rican 
I, 
minds, replacing the previous concern for the region as a market 
for American goods. 
This chapter traces the origins and development~s of 
America's newfound interest in the oil of the Netherlands East 
Indies. First, the reasons underlying U.S. concern for foreign 
War I are examined. Next, American diplomatic 
1 
oil after World 
efforts in the Netherlands East Indies are summarized. I The 
chapter concludes with an evaluation of the sucoess of Uhited 
States oil diplomacy in Southeast Asia. 
After World War One, Americans, government officials and 
private citizens alike, became increasingly anxious about the 











years in the early 1920's. foreign oil 
in the foreign policy of the United 
States. Am.rican appeals for foreign oil concessions were based 
on the principle of reciprocity. The State Department argued that 
I 
American otl firms abroad should receive treatment similar to 
I 
that enjoyed by foreign oil firms operating in the United States, 
Washington, therefore, took an active interest in the 
work of American oil companies abroad, filing complaints with 
government$ believed to exclude or restrict American partici-
I 
i 
pation. Tfuese efforts at oil diplomacy encompassed many regions. 
I 
At orle tJ..'mel or another. the U.S. d n ,government ma e representations 
on behalf of American firms in the Middle East, Romania, Latin 
I 
America, a.Qd the Netherlands East Indies. These areas represented 
I 
virtually $very significant oil producing region of the time. 
Th$ origins of aggressive oil diplomacy were twofold. 
I 
First, the emergence of new petroleum-using technologies made oil 
far more si«nificant to the national well-being in 1920 than it 
had been just ten years earlier. Simultaneously, a fear that 
America was rapidly exhausting its domestic oil reserves arose. 
i 
This conc¢rn for future oil supplies was the second principal 
I 
I 
cause for ~eightened US interest in foreign oil, 
The experiences of World War I provided much of the 
impetus for American interest in oil. The war underscored for all 
nations the importance of oil to national defense. British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon's famous 
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remark that "the Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil" wa~ 
typical of such sentiments. (l) The rise of petroleum did not
r 
however, begin with the war. The origins of oil's new prominence 
could be seen already in the prewar years. Until the firsb 
! 
i 
decades of the twentieth century, the primary value of petroleuf 
was as a source of light and heat in homes. (2) Oil burnin~ 
engines did exist, but they were still relatively unusual. The 
first important step towards petroleum dependence was the conver; 
i 
sian of ships from coal to oil burning engines. The first navy to 
I 
undertake this change was Italy, which began the conversion t? 




British and American navies had converted to oil burning engines; 
(3 ) 
i 
But it was not until the war itself that the importance 
of this change was realized. Even prewar military planners 
greatly underestimated the supplies of oil needed to wage ~ 
modern war. (4) Unlike earlier conflicts, the battles of Wor14 
War I were cpntested with oil-fueled technologies. Virtually all 
of the weapons innovations introduced into the conflict depended 
on oil. The tanks, submarines, airplanes, and mechanized ground 
I 
vehicles which distinguished the 1914-1918 war from its predei 
cessors all required unrestricted access to oil. (5) In additiod 
! 
to these new weapons, traditional military technologies like 
ships had also become oil-fueled. Given the modern war machine's 
need for oil, even the briefest of interruptions in the oil 
supply line could spell defeat for any belligerent. Thus, a1 ..... 
30 
though the motement towards oil dependency began much earlier, 
" I 
the significan~e of the change was not fully comprehended until 
World War I forbed the realization upon world leaders. 
I 
! 
The war! also changed the relationship between government 
and the oil industry. Before the war, issues of oil production, 
refining, and distribution had been solely private, commercial 
concerns. With the outbreak of hostilities, however, military 
planners in Amprica and Europe developed close cooperative ties 
with the major oil firms to insure stable supply lines. (6) 
Governmental in~olvement in oil matters during the war served as 
an important precedent. Oil-government cooperation would continue 
into the postwar years. 
Increased military significance represented only part of 
the enhanced significance of oil to modern society. Petroleum's 
value carried over into the peacetime economy as well. American 
leaders of the early 1920's quickly recognized the importance of 
oil to do~estic prosperity. Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes summed up the American view in 1921. 
Ample supplies of petroleum have become indispensable 
to the lifie and prosperity of my country as a whole, 
because af the fact that the United States is an 
I 
industrial! nat.ion in which distance renders transporta-
tion dif~icult, and agriculture depends largely on 
labor-saviing devices using· petroleum products. (7) 
The economic boom of the war years had been fueled 
largely by oil. Some feared that the American economy would 
collapse without plentiful and inexpensive oil supplies. The rise 
of the automobile lent added significance to petroleum supplies. 
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The years just after World War One saw the beginning of mass-
" produced automobiles. Cars ceased to be the luxury that they had 
been earlier. Hundreds of thousands of Americans bought cars for 
the first time and gasoline consumption rose dramatioally.· (8) 
Sales of gasoline in the United States rose from six million 
barrels in 1899 to seventy-five million barrels twenty years 
later. (9) 
American ooncern for oil supplies was merely a part of a 
wider global trend. Almost every world power was pursuing similar 
objeotives. Indeed, in many respects, the US effort lagged behind 
that of the British. (10) However, there was one important 
factor, not shared by other powers, that further strengthened the 
American push for foreign oil. Simultaneous with the global 
realization of oil's importance in the world, Americans began to 
fear that domestic oil reserves were approaching exhaustion. This 
apprehension of imminent production shortfalls constituted the 
second principal motive behind US oil diplomacy in the 1920's. 
(11) 
For years the United States had dominated world oil 
production. The oil industry first rose to prominence in the 
1860's and for a short time the United States enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly internationally. Between 1913 and 1917, American crude 
oil production still accounted for just over sixty-five percent 
of the world total. (12) During the war, U.S. oil firms supplied 
eighty percent of the Allies' oil needs. (13) But this massive 
production at home had seriously depleted known oil reserves. The 
32 
situation seemed ~rave to contemporary observers. In 1920. Secre-
tary of State Baiinbridge Colby estimated that the U. S. possessed 
approximately 12% of the world's petroleum reserves, while its 
annual needs accounted for 70% of the world's annual supply. (14) 
! 
The danger of imminent resource crisis sharply contrasted 
with traditional: American concepts of its vast raw materials 
wealth. The United States had customarily seen itself as blessed 
with almost limitless supplies of virtually every vital natural 
I 
resource. A prominent American banker announced in 1902 that "of 
all nations the United States has the most unbounded wealth of 
natural resources,. We have hardly comprehended the inevitable 
advantages which those resources are to give us." (15) 
There were, however, voices of warning even before World 
War I. During the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford 
Pinchot released a study which warned that the United States was 
consuming its resources recklessly. (16) Similar alarms were 
sounded more frequently during the 1910's. A fast-growing and , 
influential school of thought emerged that saw struggles for 
scarce resources as the key determinant of future international 
developments. Among the adherents to this viewpoint were Brooks 
I 
i 
Adams and George O:lt-is Smith, the director of the United States 
Geological Survey in the Department of Interior. (17) Despite 
such warnings, however, most Americans remained unaware of the 
country's precarious raw materials base until the 1920's. 
The publication of the U.S. Geological Survey prepared 
under the directiion of George Otis Smith shook this complacency. 
33 
Released, shortly after the end of World War I. the Survey gave 
i 
new urgency to the American quest for oil abroad. (18) Smith's 
report ~arned that existing American oil reserves would be 
I 
exhausted in less than thirty years at existing consumption 
rates. The combined forces of oil's new significance and fears of 
domestic production shortfalls resulted in nothing short of an 
oil panic. Suddenly, oil diplomacy was one of the vital issues of 
the day.' 
, 
bil diplomaoy itself was nothing new. The United States 
had aotied IOn behalf of US oi 1 interests abroad intermittently 
before 1:920. These initial efforts at oi 1 diplomacy were irregu-
lar and generally of short duration. In 1902, the State Depart-
ment filed protests with the British Foreign Office on behalf of 
Standard Oil interests in Burma. (19) The United States again 
applied official pressure in 1910 supporting Admiral Colby Ches-
ter's claims for concessions in the Ottoman Empire. (20) Oil 
diplomacy also factored heavily in American relations with Mexico 
after 1910. The battles of the Mexican Revolution threatened to 
disrupt the aotivities of U.S. oil companies; the possibility 
that one! of the revolutionary factions would sieze the oil fields 
I 
I 
posed a ~reater danger. The Mexican Constitution written in 1917 
, 
realized these fears; Article 27 of the new constitution deolared 
that the state held unalienable ownership of all subsoil rights. 
The State Department sought guarantees that this provision would 
not be applied retroactively against U.S. holdings. The oil 
companies themselves also expended tremendous energy and money in 
34 
I 
an effort to buy favot with the rival factions in Mexico. (21) 
I 
Despite Washi*gton's efforts in Mexico, early U.S. oil 
! 
diplomacy met with little success. Given the low intensity and 
short duration of American protests, the foreign governments in 
question could affo~d to simply ignore the State Department's 
: 
protests. Thus, these early instances of American diplomatic 
concern for oil matters do not reflect an enduring and important 
policy. Rather, American oil diplomacy before World War One, 
I 
although it did exist,! was not yet fully developed. 
The unawarene~s of the importance of oil and the danger 
of dwindling American reserves were not the only reasons that 
pre-war American oil diplomacy had been weak. Government offi-
cials were also unwilling to promote U.S. oil interests abroad 
because of domestic political considerations. American leaders 
shared a widespread fear that strong support for the major oil 
firms, especially Stahdard Oil, could lead to charges of corrup-
tion. In the early twentieth century, Standard enjoyed a sinister 
~ 
reputation among the general public. Given this public atmos-




in 1911, it no~ surprising that government officials were 
A I 
of the danger~ of close association with Standard. Public 
I 
sentiment against oil companies "precluded aid that was too overt 
in character." (22) 
The State Department's lukewarm commitment to oil dip-
lomacy changed rapidly after 1918, however. A broad spectrum of 
forces pressured officials in Washington to develop a more active 
35 
foreign oil policy, (23) In 1920, the Senate passed Resolution 
331 which directed the State Department to gather information on 
restrictions faced by American oil interests around the world. SR 
331 also required the State Department to report to Congress all 
measures being taken to alleviate cases of discrimination. (24) 
In 1920, the Democratic Party platform recognized "the importance 
of the acquisition by Americans of additional sources of supply 
of petroluem and other minerals" and called for increased diplo-
matic support for American oil firms abroad. (25) 
Private interests also agitated for government action on 
behalf of American oil firms. In September 1919, the Board of 
Directors of the American Petroleum Institute called for dip-
lomatic aid in securing equal treatment for U.S. oil companies 
abroad. (26) The American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical 
Engineers also pressed the US government throughout 1919 and 1920 
for more active support of American oil interests abroad. At the 
time of these appeals, the President of the Institute of Mining 
, 
and Metallurgical Engineers was Herbert Hoover. The oil activists 
were assured a strong voice in the Harding administration when 
Hoover becrune Secretary of Commerce in 1921. (27) The national 
media also joined the clamor for greater support of American oil 
interests abroad. Lit~~~ Digest warned that the quest for 
foreign oil was ultimately "a battle for world trade, commercial 
supremacy, naval dominance, and the control of the air." (28) 
American oil diplomacy soon focused on a few key regions includi-
ng the Netherlands East Indies. 
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The Netherlands E~st Indies were a third focal point of 
I 
American oil diplomacy in ~he 1920's. The interest of American 
oil firms in the East rlndies predated the beginning of active 
governmental support. Beginining in the late 1890's. many American , 
oil firms, including the Sinclair Oil Company. Gulf Oil, Standard 
Oil of New Jersey and California, and the Pure Oil Company, 
sought concessions in the East Indies. Most of these companies 
were active in the Indies for only a short time. One company, 
, 
however, was remarkable :for its persistence: the Standard Oil 
Company (after 1911, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey). 
American diplomatic efforts, therefore, centered on obtaining a 
concession for Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
To fully understand the situation as of 1920 when 
American diplomatic support began, it is useful to first review 
Standard Oil's previous experiences in the Netherlands East 
Indies. These began before the beginning of the century. As noted 
in the preceding chapter, Standard's first involvement in the , 
Indies came from kerosene exports to the Dutch colony. This 
venture proved wildly successful and by 1890, thirty-five years 
i after the first kerosene sa;les, Standard Oil had forged a strong 
I 
network in the East Indiies. Standard's presence in the 
I, 
archipelago in these years was limited to marketing interests. 
The first commer<cially viable oil deposits in the 
Netherlands East Indies were discovered in 1885. Within seven 
years, Standard Oil was actively seeking entrance into East 
Indian oil production. (29) In 1894, Standard Oil established 
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offioes in Batavia, Java for the purpose of aoquiring oil lands. 
(30) Standard's early efforts to aoquire oil concessions took 
several different forms. Initially, Standard tried to buy oil 
rights from existing East Indian companies. This strategy 
included the outright acquisition of smaller oil companies as 
well as purchases of oil rights on a specific block of land from 
those companies. 
In 1892, Standard attempted to buyout the fledgling 
Royal Dutch Company. Royal Dutch turned to the Netherlands 
government for protection. The Colonial administration, concerned 
at the prospect of foreigners in the East Indian oil industry, 
blocked the sale. Three years later, Standard again offered to 
buy Royal Dutch outright. Again the Netherlands government 
intervened to protect the smaller company. (31) The Dutoh passed 
a new law requiring that the directors of all oil companies in 
the Netherlands East Indies be Dutch citizens. (32) This 
provision effectively excluded Standard Oil. 
Despite such setbacks, Standard Oil continued to offer 
buyouts of East Indian oil companies. In 1897, Standard was 
poised to buy substantial concessions in Sumatra from the Moera 
Enim Petroleum Company. (33) Moera Enim was prepared to complete 
the sale, terms had been agreed to, but at the last moment, the 
Colonial government intervened. The Minister of Colonies, J.T. 
Cremer, advised officers of Moera Enim that if its Sumatran 
fields were sold to Standard, the government would not grant 
Moera Enim any further permits to produce oil or renew the 
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exploitation rights on lands the company currently had under 
production. (34) Faced with these threats, Moera Enim broke off 
the agreement with Standard Oil and, instead, sold the property 
in question to the Royal Dutch Company; the Minister of Colonies 
quickly approved this transaction. (35) 
The Netherlands government acted largely to protect the 
interests of the Royal Dutch ~ompany. The principal element 
behind the Colonial Ministry's intervention, was Royal Dutch's 
influence within the government, rather than any real fear of 
American economic penetration. The offioers of Royal Dutch, 
wishing to avoid the stiff competition that would result if 
Standard Oil began production in the Indies, used their olose 
connections with top government offioials to block the sale. (36) 
Standard's efforts to buy proven oil lands were not entirely 
fruitless, however. Despite the interferenoe of the Dutch 
government, the oompany was able to acquire the rights to some 
oil lands from third parties. These concessions, however, were 
almost invariably worthless. (37) 
Despite these setbacks and internal chaos resulting from 
the dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911, the company persisted. 
Standard's interests in the East Indies were transferred to 
Standard Oil of New Jersey which continued to bid for oil lands 
in the Dutch colony. In 1912, Jersey Standard formed the 
Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (NKPM or 
Koloniale) under Dutch laws. (38) The creation of NKPM heralded a 
new strategy on the part of Standard Oil. Earlier efforts had 
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been limited to buying previously surveyed and lioensed oil lands 
from other companies. Koloniale, however, was formed to bid for 
oil concessions on unexplored and undeveloped territories. Under 
the Dutch Mining Law, companies could not be awarded concessions 
unless they were incorporated in the Netherlands or the 
Netherlands East Indies. NKPM satisfied these requirements and 
submitted a bid for concessions in the Djambi region of Sumatra. 
(39) At the time, the Djambi fields were generally viewed as the 
most important oil lands in the East Indies. (40) Once again, 
however, the Netherlands government acted to block Standard's 
efforts. 
Three bids for the Djambi concessions were submitted to 
the Colonial government in 1912. NKPM and an independent Dutch 
firm both outbid Royal Dutch. These bids, however, were not 
accepted. (41) Rather than grant the Djambi concessions to NKPM, 
the Dutch colonial government suspended all new oil concessions 
throughout the East Indies as of 1913. (42) 
~ 
This moratorium on concessions was intended to exclude 
Jersey Standard from the East Indies. The new mining law was a 
direct response to Standard's new tactic of pursuing concessions 
on virgin lands. The old law had been quite satisfactory to the 
government and Royal Dutch "until the moment that the Standard 
undertook seriously to enter the field through its subsidiary, 
Koloniale." (43) Although the suspension of exploration licenses 
applied equally to all oil companies, the policy favored Royal 
Dutch Shell because "their holdings were already so extensive, 
40 
that the failure to obtain new territories handicapped them but 
slightly." (44) 
The events of 1912-1913 unfolded without any support from 
i 
the United States government. It is not eve~ clear that the State 
I 
Department was aware of the actions taken akainst Standard Oil in 
the East Indies at the time. Official American concern did not 
begin until the postwar oil panic spurred W~shington into action. 
American attention quickly focused on Dutch mining law. In 
January H~20, the American Consul in Batavia, 
I 
Charles Jewell, 
warned Washington of discrimination against American oil 
I 
companies in the East Indies. Jewell urged'the State Department 
to take "strong action to bring about a favorable change in what 
I 
appears to be intolerable conditions governing the granting of 
mineral oil concessions in Netherlands India." (45) The passage 
of Senate Resolution 331 in March 1920 marked another important 
step in official U.S. involvement. SR 331 ordered U.S. consulates 
throughout the world to report on the conditions faced by 
American oil firms abroad. The consuls in both the East Indies 
and Holland itself reported that current Dutch mining law did, in 
fact, discriminate against U.S. companies irl the Indies. (46) 




of American oil 
consciousness, the Netherlands reopened consideration of the 
Djambi concessions. The moratorium on concessions enacted in 1913 
had never been more than a temporary solution. Suspension of the 
mining law brought the development of East Indian oil to a halt. 
Consequently, the government forfeited the· additional revenues 
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that increased oil production would have generated. Given the 
undesirability of a prolonged moratorium on concessions, it is 
perhaps surprising that it continued for more than four years. 
The length of this freeze serves as an indicator both of Dutch 
determination to exclude foreign companies and, more importantly, 
the strong influence of Royal Dutch Shell over the Netherlands 
government. The moratorium did not, however, solve any of the 
underlying problems. When a New Mining Law was enacted in 1918,· 
the issue of concessions in the Djambi came to the fore almost 
immediately. 
In early 1920, a bill granting all concessions in the 
Djambi region to the Royal Dutch Shell Company came up for 
consideration before the Estates General of the Netherlands. The 
State Department instructed its officers in the Netherlands to 
closely follow the progress of the Djambi bill. (47) In view of 
the importance of the proposed concessions. William Phillips, the 
United States Ambassador at The Hague, made representations to 
the Colonial Ministry requesting the relaxation of restrictions 
against U.S. oil interests in the East Indies and the inclusion 
of American oil firms in the Djambi bill. (48) 
The State Department's case rested on the principle of 
reciprocity. Washington argued that American companies operating 
abroad should be entitled to treatment equivalent to that 
encountered by foreign firms in the United States. The State 
Department informed the Netherlands Government in April 1920 
~--_that its policy with reference to the petroleum 
42 
I 
resources of Netherlands India is a matter of: concern 
to this Government (US); that it is the view: of this 
Government that this policy, so far as revea!led and 
understood, is apparently in many respects antagonistic 
to the principal of reciprocity, which. it is b~lieved, 
should, so far as possible, govern the ~conomic 
relations of the US and the Netherlands with reference 
to access to raw materials. (49) 
The State Department also claimed that America was entitled to 
East Indian oil because its domestic reserves were exhausted. 
Secretary of State Hughes called on the Netherlands to admit 
American firms because "the United States has for years carried a , 
I, 
burden of supplying a large part of the petroleum . consumed by 
other countries, and that the petroleum resources of no other 
country have been so heavily drawn upon to meet foreign needs as 
the petroleum resources of the United States." (50) Hughes argued 
that because America had emptied its own petroleum'reserves to 
supply the rest of the world's needs, including that of the 
Netherlands, the United States should be allowed aocess to oil 
deposits in those countries. 
The N~therlands quickly dismissed this latter argument. 
While the Dutch reply was phrased diplomatically, the essence of 
it was captured in a British newspaper. 
i 
There is the idea, that American oil has been h~ded as 
a gift to the world for which the world oweslAmerica 
gratitude to be exprest in allowing Americans to enter 
every oil-field. We do not imagine that any1country 
will take that altruistic view of the situation. Just 
as Americans sold their oil for the best price they 
could obtain when they were the chief prodUCers, so 
they will have to pay the world price if their own 
supplies are inadequate. (51) 




reciprocal treatment. The Netherlands government denied any 
, 
dlscrimination against American oil interests in the East Indies. 
B~th Minister for Foreign Affairs van Karnebeck and the Dutch 
i 
~bassador in Washington de Beaufort claimed that mining law in 
tbe East Indies applied to American and Dutch subjects equally. 
D~ Beaufort told Hughes, "American citizens have with respect to 
tbe law the same facilities as Netherlands subjects to obtain the 
cQntracts in question provided that they adopt the form of a 
Netherlands or Netherlands East Indian company." (52) This 
, 
effectively denied any discrimination against the Standard 
i 
i~terests~because NKPM was incorporated under Dutch laws. 
As evidence of the existence of an Open Door, the Dutch 
nbted that NKPM had already received several oil concessions in 
I 
the East Indies. In February, 1921, the Dutch announced that NKPM 
had received four new oil concessions in September of the 
p:teceding year. (53) This announcement clearly surprised the 
State Department; it contradicted their understanding of events 
w 
in the East Indies. A letter from Standard Oil of New Jersey's 
William Mansfield in March of 1921 clarified the situation. 
M~nsfield revealed that the concessions in question had actually 
I 
bren secured by Dutch companies before the suspension of the Old 
Mining Law in 1913. NKPM had subsequently purchased these 
eXploitation rights, but they did not represent new concessions. 
(54) 
The Netherlands offered alternative explanations for the 
failure of American oil interests to secure concessions. The 
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I 
Dutch attributed NKPM's lack of success to its lateiarrival in 
the field. The Colonial Ministry claimed that Dutch co~panies had 
I 
concessions long ~efore NKPM shown interest in East Indian , 
entered the field. This late start meant that many poncessions 
! 
had already been awarded before NKPM expressed any int~rest. (55) 
The record, however, does not support the Dutch claifu. Between 
1910 and 1920, NKPM applied for more than six thousand 
prospecting licenses in the Indies; only two of these licenses 
were granted, both before 1913. During the same ten y~ars, Royal 
Dutch Shell recieved 945 prospecting licenses, inclpding more 
than two hundred after 1913. (56) 
I 
Dutch diplomats expressed regret at any diffi~ulties met 
by U.S. firms in the East Indies. They claimed that any 
impediments to foreign oil interests were not d~rected at 
Americans, but rather at other countries, presumably the 
Japanese. Foreign Minister van Karnebeck defended h~s country 
against American Open Door rhetoric. He claimed that the relative 
weakness of ~he Netherlands justified greater protectionism. 
The United States was a great Power which easily could 
look after its own interests, whereas Holland was a 
small Power which had to be very careful i~ its 
dealings with foreign countries, especially withi~ the 
colonial empire; otherwise its colonial posse~sions 
might pass under the political control of another 
power. (57) I 
Faced with stiff Dutch resistance to American pleas for 
the Open Door, the State Department looked for a stronger weapon. 
Ambassador Phillips wrote from The Hague, "I am convinced that I 
can do nothing further here unless I am in a position to state 
45 
i 
that retaliatory measures will be employed against the Dutch oil 
I ~ 
int~rests in America unless American capital is permitted to 
par~icipate in the Netherlands Indies." (58) The Public Lands 
Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 offered the State Department 
just such a threat. The Act prohibited the leasing of public 
lands in the United States to citizens of any "country, the laws, 
customs, or regulations of which, deny similar or like privileges 
to citizens or corporations of this country." Corporations with 
stoqk owned, held, or controlled by citizens of non-reciprocating 
couqtries were also barred from new leases on public lands. (59) 
Almqst as soon as the Public Lands Leasing Act was passed, U.S. 
officials contemplated invoking it against the Netherlands. By 
July 1920, the State Department had concluded that Dutch mining 
laws did, in fact, discriminate against American oil companies. 
U.S. citizens in the East Indies were denied privileges accorded 
to Netherlands citizens in the United States. 
Retaliation was not immediately forthcoming, however, 
because the administration of the Public Lands Leasing Act was 
charged to the Department of Interior. No action could be taken 
" unt:lJ1 Interior determined whether the Netherlands was a "non-
I 
! 
rec~procating" nation. (60) The decision fell to the General Land 
I 
i 
Office in the Department of Interior. Throughout 1920, the GLO 
vacillated as to whether or not the Netherlands should be 
declared a "non-reciprocating" country, By September 22, 1920, 
however, a decision was reached. Until the situation in the 
Netherlands East Indies altered, the United States would not 
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i 
issue permits or leases under the act of February ~5. 
1920 to corporations organized under the laws of theiUS 
where the controlling or major portions of the stock of 
the corporation is owned, held, or controlled by 
citizens of the Netherlands. (61) I 
" 
After that time, Dutch firms were barred from all new oil 
" 
concessions on public lands in the United States. When the 
Netherlands government protested the American decision, Secretary 
of State Hughes informed them that only a revision of Dutch 
mining law could change the situation. (62) 
The Netherlands refused to alter the mining law, but held 
out the hope of a private settlement. Throughout the nego~iations 
with the United States, Dutch diplomats professed to slncerelY 
desire American capital in the Indies. Unwilling to alter the 
mining law in the Indies, the Netherlands government suggested a 
private agreement between Royal Dutch Shell and American capital. 
Minister of Colonies de Graaff hinted to Ambassador Phillips that 
he would urge Royal Dutch Shell to adopt such an arrangment. (63) 
Phillips si~zed on this as a last chance to secure American 
participation in the Djambi. (64) U.S. diplomats accepted the 
good faith of the Dutch. They genuinely expected the Netherlands 
, 
government to pressure Royal Dutch Shell into admitting ~erican 
part.ners. (65) 
Royal Dutch Shell proved uncooperative and negotiations 
soon fell through. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands Government 
expressed its regret but took no action. Despite this setback, 
Phillips clung to the hope of a private settlement. He continued 
to believe that American diplomatic efforts would sway the Dutch 
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position (66) Royal Dutch Shell's resistance remained adamant. 
however, and in April 1921 the Estates General granted the Djambi 
concessi9ns to the Dutch company. (67) Ambassador Phillips blamed 
I 
this de~eat on the American oil companies' insufficient interest 
in the negotiations. He lamented that diplomatic efforts would 
not succeed "until American businessmen understand that they 
themselves must take an active and intelligent interest in such 
affairs. /. (68) 
, 
American interest in East Indian oil concessions 
I 
continue~ throughout the 1920's. Finally. in 1928, NKPM was 
awarded isubstantial concessions in Sumatra. The significance of 
these f~elds can be seen in the fact that American oil firms' 
share of total East Indian oil production rose from 3.1% in 1927 
to 23% 'nine years later. (69) Charles Raynor, the State 
Department petroleum advisor summed up the American effort thus 
in 1945,' 
the Netherlands Government at first did not accede to 
our rep~esentations and negotiations continued through 
the early 1920's. With a view to exerting further 
pressure on the Netherlands Government the American 
Government took steps to block the issuance of further 
concessions to the Royal Dutch Shell in public lands in 
the: United States. The final result was that the New. 
Jer~ey company was given additional producing 
concessions in the Indies which turned out to be some 
of the richest in the islands. (70) 
Raynor's assessment was soon adopted by others; an 
enduring consensus developed. Virtually every analysis of 
American oil diplomacy since has concluded that the granting of 
concessions to NKPM in 1928 marked a triumph for the State 
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Department, Adherents to this position include Peter Melilt'sh 
i 
I 
Reed. James Gould, Irvine Anderson, Stephen Krasner, Edjward 
I 
i 
Chester, and Fiona Venn. Although their analyses differ some~hat, 
all ultimately reach the conclusion that American diploJatic 
efforts were vital and indispensable to the winning of the iEast 
i 
Indian concessions. Taken as a whole, their writings represent a 
consensus that has lasted almost forty years. The simil~rity 
between the oldest of these works and the most recent d~mon-
I 
I 
strates the enduring nature of the consensus. Charles Ra:YTIor,! who 
wrote his summary of American oil diplomacy in the Nether~ands 
i 
East Indies in 1945 while serving as the State 
I 
Department's 
petroleum adviser, concluded that "there seems to be l:iJttle 
question that without the diplomatic support of the American 
Government, American oil companies could never have obtained 
equal facilities with Netherlands companies for the develo~ment 
of petroleum deposits in the Netherlands Indies." (71) Forty-one 
years late~, Fiona Venn reached a strikingly similar conclusion. 
In reference to American efforts on behalf of Jersey Standard in 
the Indies she wrote, "yet again, United States 
I 
support for an American company had led to substantive chang1s in 
the policy of another government, with consequent advantages I for 
American commerci interests." (72) All of these scholars ~rgue 
that the State Department's persistent efforts ultimately icom-
pelled the Dutch Government to admit American oil firms. In 
particular, they cite American retaliation against Dutch. oil 




Writ~ng in 1958, Peter Mellish Reed concluded that "ap-
i 
prehension o~ being declared a "non-reciprocal" country under the 
terms of the u.s. Public Land Leasing Act was one of the 
principal fJctors in the Dutch decision to admit American oil 
I 
companies. ('~3 ) Three years later, James Gould, an historian and 
former Foreign Service officer, echoed Reed's praise for American 
diplomatic efforts. Gould credited President Hoover and Secre-
: 
taries of Stdte Hughes and Kellogg with opening the door for U.S. 
I 
i 
firms in the iNetherlands East Indies. He also cited the threat 
I 
I 
of retaliation as an important influence in the Dutch decision. 
"The intense :interest of the Dutch government in the position of 
Shell in the 'United States makes it clear that the opening of the 
Indies was a result of the policy of commercial reciprocity 
advanced by William Phillips in 1920, approved by Secretary of 
State Colby, and adhered to by his successors for eight years ... 
(74) Other, less exhaustive treatments of the episode agree with 
Raynor, Reed, and Gould. The works of Irvine Anderson, Stephen 
Krasner, Edward Chester, and Fiona Venn all concur with the 
assessment of American oil diplomacy in the Netherlands East 
i 
Indies as a success. (75) 
I 
i These scholars' conclusions depend heavily on one a-
nother. Few included a thorough examination of the relevant 
primary materials. Raynor, who presented h conclusions in 1945, 
based his findings solely on excerpts from the State Department 
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While these excerpts provide a valuable framework for unde~­
standing the broad features of American diplomatic action, they 
are far from complete. Peter Mellish Reed's 1958 work is based on 
records referred to simply as "Petroleum Dutch East Indies" 
(PDEI). PDEI seems to be a collection of State Department 
correspondence on oil diplomacy in the Indies. However, no other 
scholar cites such a source and I have been unable to discern 
what the PDEI records contain or where they are located. Although 
Reed refers to State Department correspondence which is not 
included in the E~gn ~~tiQU~ series, he never cites official 
document numbers. Thus, while the PDEI records contain more than 
the [Q~ign R~~iQu§ series, it is difficult to determine 
whether all of the State Department correspondence was included. 
Reed's research appears to have focused on the events of 1920 and 
1921. There is little account of developments later in the 
decade, opening the question as to whether these materials were 
included in the PDEI records. 
None of the subsequent scholars (Gould, Anderson, Kras-
ner, Chester, and Venn), went further than the EQJ;:eign ~~ti.Qn.§. 
series in researching the topic. Most simply cited Rayner and 
Reed. This reliance on secondary sources is understandable given 
the broad scope of most of these works. American oil diplomacy in 
the Netherlands East Indies was a relatively minor concern within 
the framework of larger studies. It would not have been feasible 
or even worthwhile for these scholars to undertake primary 
research on this topic. 
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i 
The belief in the efficacy of American oil diplomacy 'is 
i 
not unanimously shared, however. Gerald Nash's United 5t~§£ Qil 
fQl~ laaQ=1iQ4 (1968) presented a rather different inter-
pretation. Nash berated the State Department in strong t·erms for 
weakness and diplqmatic incompetence. 
The diplomatic skills of both the later Wilson and the 
Harding Administrations were meager. The policies of 
Robert Lansing, Bainbridge Colby, and Charles Evans 
Hughes revealed many weaknesses and vacillations. As a 
result, American efforts to secure foreign oil con-
cessions in· the Middle East and Sumatra met only 
minimal success. (76) 
Nash's position, however, has had little influence on 
other scholars. This is hardly surprising given his poor command 
of the facts of the case. Among his more glaring errors was the 
assertion that, "while [NKPM] received some concessions, these 
were not of major importance." (77) The concessions granted NKPM 
after 1928 were tremendously important and allowed for a sixteen-
fold increase in NKPM's production between 1927 and 1937. Irvine 
Anderson cited this very flaw as a reason for dismissing Nash's 
conclusions. (78) In addition, Nash's book failed to advance an 
alternative explanation for the change in Dutch oil policy. His 
work was limited Ito fierce criticisms of American diplomacy and 
I 
offered no counter explanation for NKPM's success after 1928. 
Close examination of the complete State Department files 
on American oil diplomacy in the Netherlands East Indies reveals 
that Nash, despite the weakness of his argument, had stumbled 
onto the right conclusion. Contrary to the consensus that has 
endured from Ra~nor to Venn, diplomatic efforts on behalf of 
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American oil interests in the Netherlands East Indies had little 
direct impact on the granting of ooncessions to Standard Oil in 
1928. American oil diplomacy failed to achieve its objectives; 
First, we must understand what the objeotives of American 
policy were. United States oil diplomaoy sought to insure oppor-
tunities not only for Jersey Standard, but for all American 
companies. The State Department explicitly stated that equality 
of opportunity should apply to every American firm. In 1920, 
Acting Secretary of State Norman Davis oautioned Ambassador 
Phillips that a private agreement between a single American 
company and the Dutoh government would not be "satisfactory in 
regard either to principle or to permanenoy" (79) Four years 
later, Secretary of State Hughes reiterated this position. "This 
Government is seeking equality of opportunity for American com-
panies, not a particular opportunity for one or some American 
companies." (80) The State Department seemed to rule out the 
possibility pf accepting any such settlement. "We cannot abandon 
our policy and say that a grant to the Koloniale will be 
satisfactory." (81) 
With the objectives of the State Department clearly in 
mind, even a relatively brief analysis reveals that they were not 
achi Even after the Dutch offered concessions to NKPM in 
1928, the door was never truly open to American oil interests. 
Firms other than Jersey Standard repeatedly complained to the 
State Department of discrimination in the East Indies long after 




California's Franci$ B. Loomis, a former Under Secretary of 
I 
State. pleaded for State Department support into the early 
i 
! 
1930·s. In view of C.lifornia Standard's continued inability to 
I , 
secure a concessio* in the East Indies, Loomis asked that the 
Netherlands be declared a "non-reciprocating" country once again. 
, 
(82) The State Department, however, refused to take any action on 
Standard Oil of California's behalf. (83) A year later, Loomis 
again sought assistance, noting that "no foreign-owned company 
I 
, 
other than the Koioniale has a concession or contract covering 
possible oil areas in the Island of Sumatra - or. for that 
matter, anywhere el$e in the Dutch East Indies - obtained under 
exisiting laws," (84) The State Department held to its position 
that the Open Door aireadY existed in the Indies. Loomis was not 
alone in encountering discrimination after 1928. William T. 
Wallace, Vice President of Gulf Oil, wrote in March 1932, "It 
looks to me very much indeed as if however wide open the door in 
the Dutch East Indies may be in theory, as a practical matter and • 
from the standpoint of profitable and unhampered operation it is 
at least pretty effectively barred." (85) It is both ironic and 
instructive to contrdst these sentiments with those expressed by 
I 
Jersey Standard and ~KPM. In 1933, George Walden of NKPM informed 
the State Department that the Dutch government had cooperated 
fully with his company. Walden told American diplomats that all 
was well in the East Indies and assured them that "there has 
never been anything reasonable that we have failed to obtain from 
the Dutch Government.'" (86) 
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State Department offioials were also aware that dis-
crimination against American oil interests persisted in the East 
Indies. In both February and November of 1934, Dutch Prime 
Minister Colijn told Ambassador Swenson that the colonial admin-
istration did not want any new oil companies (besides Royal Dutch 
Shell and NKPM) to begin operations in the East Indies. (87) Even 
those scholars who saw oil diplomacy as a success admit that 
American companies other than Jersey Standard faced continued 
obstacles. (88) Oil production statistics also contradict the 
idea of an open door. No American company besides Jersey Standard 
produced significant quantities of oil in the Netherlands East 
Indies during the 1930s. Although Standard of California did 
acquire some properties in the East Indies during the 1930's, the 
only two oil companies operating on a large scale in the East 
Indies before World War II were Royal Dutch Shell and Koloniale. 
(89) Thus, it is clear that although the door was opened for 
Jersey Standard, other American oil interests continued to face 
discriminatibn in the Netherlands East Indies. In the State 
Department's 0~1 terms, such a result was clearly a failure. 
Close examination of American oil diplomacy reveals other 
reasons to question its success. Historian Michael Hogan argued 
that the American formula for international economic cooperation, 
including the notion of reciprocity, depended ultimately on the 
willingness of other countries "to sacrifice privilege and tradi-
tional principles for the sake of cooperative action." (90) This 
approach reveals the weakness of the U.S. position. Looking at 
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I 
the matter from the Dut¢h perspective, it is diffioult to see any 
! 
I 
compelling reason for the Netherlands to acquiesce to American 
demands. 
i 
Royal Dutch Shell was intimately connected with the upper 
levels of the Netherlan~s government. Many of the Ministers were 
former officers of Royal Dutch Shell and nearly all were stock-
holders. Thus, the Dutch leaders had little reason to want 
I 
foreigners exploiting ,East Indian oil. In 1923, the American 
consul in Batavia, 
! 
Charles L. Hoover, wondered "why it is 
expected 
, 
that the Dutch will voluntarily surrender 
! 
one of the 
most profitable fields of investment which the members of the 
inner circle of the government of Holland have." (91) 
The United States argument was built on the principle of 
reciprocity. The Netherlands, however, did not share this Ameri-
can commitment to the ideology of equal access; the Dutch 
government explicitly defended its right to enact restrictionist 
measures. (92) Thus, they were not very susceptible to American 
t 
Open Door appeals. American diplomats at the time recognized the 
weakness of their case. In 1920, Secretary of State Colby 
questioned whether the ~iplomatic corps could do anything to aid 
I 
American oil companies ~broad. (93) Even the normally optimistic 
Phillips dismissed the worth of the Open Door principle. "I [am] 
convinced that the arguments which I have adopted for the last 
year, based on the principle of reciprocity, were worthless." By 
May 1921, Phillips believed that harsher retaliation against 
Royal Dutch Shell in~ the United States was the only way to 
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convince the Netherlands. (94) 
State Department pleas for the prinoiple of reoiprocity 
had little influence on the Netherlands. The reciprooity argu-
ment, however, was only one half of American oil diplomacy; the 
threat of retaliation against Royal Dutch Shell interests in the 
United States served as the other half. Peter Mellish Reed argued 
that this threat was the State Department's most potent nego-
tiating tool. (95) The facts, however, do not support this 
assessment. American retaliation against Royal Dutch Shell hol-
dings in the United States was ineffective. The Public Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920 applied only to public lands which accounted 
for less than 10% of American oil lands during the 1920's. (96) 
In Enterpr:ise in Qil.::... A Hifa.!&r:Y Qf ~il in ~ lln..i~ 's:t..a!&;a., 
Kendall Beaton dismissed the importance of American retaliation; 
Beaton argued that the Federal lands in question were not 
particularly attractive to Royal Dutch Shell. (97) 
Despite the sanctions imposed under the Leasing Act, 
Royal Dutch Shell continued to produce ample quantities of oil in 
the United States. Roxana Oil, one of Shell's principal sub-
sidiaries in America increased its production from 3,000,000 
barrels in 1920 to 7,800,000 barrels by 1925. This increase was 
based primarily on purchases of new production lands in the 
western United States. (98) In 1923, two years after the Nether-
lands were declared a "non-reciprocating" nation, Shell's Ameri-
can subsidiaries accounted for 6% of total U.S. oil production, 
more "than any single American company or individual engaged in 
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the petroleum business," (~9) Kendall Beaton's En:t~i.s.~.in Qil 
provides another clear Jndication 
i 
of the ineffectiveness of 
American retaliation. Beaton entitled the chapter covering the 
years 1925-1930, when the Netherlands was designated a "'non-
reciprocating" country, "T~e Golden Era of Volume", (100) This is 
hardly consistent with the perception of retaliation as an 
effective threat to Dutch 6il interests. 
In addition to the weaknesses of the State Department 
argument noted above, the question of timing must be considered. 
The concessions to NKPM ca$e eight years after the State Depart-
ment began diplomatic representations to the Netherlands govern-
ment. Given this delay, th¢ causal relationship seems unclear at 
best, As previously noted, most of the scholars above did not 
examine the complete St~te Department records. Instead, their 
primary resources were limited to the [Q~~ign E~gtiQu§ series. 
This allowed them to miss the fact that between 1923 and 1927 the 
force and frequency of official American protests withered no-
ticeably. When one goes to the actual State Department files the 
trend is obvious. Three reels of microfilm are required for 
correspondence between 192P and 1922; the files for 1923 to 1928, 
i 
however, fit on just one and a half reels. 
I 
I 
The decline in sheer volume of correspondence, however, 
was only part of the picture. The State Department also failed to 
formulate any new arguments on behalf of American oil interests 
after 1922. Instead, U.S. diplomats merely repeated the same 
tired phrases with ever-diminishing conviction. In "The Movement 
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for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad. 1918-1920", a 
seminal work on United States oil diplomacy; John A. DeNovo 
concluded that "as the 1920's wore on, the widespread clamor for 
an energetic foreign oil policy abated considerably." (101) As a 
result, American diplomats no longer focused their attention on 
petroleum issues. 
In summary, American oil diplomacy placed no significant 
pressure on the Netherlands government. The Dutch largely ignored 
American pleas for reciprocity and retaliation against Royal 
Dutch Shell in the United States was ineffective. In addition, 
NKPM did not win concessions in the East Indies until 1928, long 
after the State Department's interest in the matter had waned. 
These facts are hardly consistent with the notion that diplomatic 
support was the key to the success of American oil companies in 
the East Indies. 
Having rejected the argument that persistent American 
diplomatic efforts resulted in the concessions to American oil 
~ 
firms, a different and more plausible explanation for the Dutch 
policy shift must be found. If pressure from the United States 
government did not force the change, why then did the Netherlands 
finally relent? To a large extent the change in Dutch policy was 
due to the efforts of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
itself. 
The burst of interest in foreign sources of oil after 
World War One was not limited to American government officials. 





ing foreign oil opportunit~es. The rise of United States oil 
I 
diplomacy coincided with a n$w aggressive, expansionist era at 
I, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey. The first postwar years marked a bold 
new era at Jersey Standard. Y9unger, more imaginative leaders had 
taken control of operations. (102) The Hitlru:;y: .Qf :t~ S:tand.aI:d. 
I 
Qil ~~ .Q! N~ ~~~ called the period beginning in 1918 "a 
time of great beginnings" for the company. (103) 
Jersey Standard's new leaders, especially the President, 
Walter Teagle, strongly emphasized the importance of increasing 
the company's crude oil production. (104) The partitioning of 
Standard Oil in 1911 had left,Jersey Standard with ample facili-
ties for refining, but relatively little crude oil production. In 
1912, Jersey Standard produced only 7,500 barrels of crude daily 
for a refinery capacity of 96,000 barrels a day. By 1918 the 
situation had improved only slightly; 84% of the crude processed 
by Jersey Standard was purcha$ed from other producers. (105) The 
search for new oil fields naturally drew Jersey Standard into 
foreign countries. In 1919 Jersey created a Foreign Production 
Department to coordinate the exploration and acquisition of 




was remarkably persistent in its pursuit 
I 
of concessions in the Netherlands East Indies. Despite the 
suspension of the Old Mining Law in 1913, NKPM continued to 
explore fields in the East Indies. Although results were dis-
appointing, Jersey Standard invested heavily. Between 1912 and 
1922, NKPM invested a total of $12,584,000 in the East Indies. Of 
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the 105 wells NKPM drilled during that time period, only thirteen 
were productive and only two yielded oil in commercially viable 
quantities. (107) This drilling and exploration took place on 
lands purchased by NKPM from third parties. Between 1922 and 
1926, NKPM invested another nine million dollars in East Indies 
exploration. (108) 
Standard Oil maintained offices both in the Netherlands 
and the East Indies beginning at least in 1900. Thus, the company 
had experienced personnel on hand to pursue its interests. Jersey 
Standard's top leaders visited the East Indies throughout the 
1920's. (109) Standard's representatives in the Netherlands kept 
tight surveillance on the activities of the Dutch Ministry of 
Colonies. In 1927, Richard Tobin, the U.S. Ambassador at The 
Hague, commended the company's vigilance in watching its inter-
ests in the States General. (110) 
Following the granting of the Djambi concessions to Royal 
Dutch Shell in 1921, the State Department had lamented the 
apparent lack of interest of American oil firms. Louis Sussdorff, 
the Charge d'Affaires at The Hague believed that Standard Oil 
would not succeed in the East Indies unless the company developed 
wider political support in the Netherlands. (111) As the twenties 
continued, Jersey Standard carefully cultivated support among 
Dutch leaders. This strategy effectively counteracted the previ-
ously close ties between Royal Dutch Shell and top Netherlands 
officials. During the 1920's, NKPM recruited many prominent Dutch 
figures, including Minister of Foreign Affairs van Karnebeck, to 
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i 
serve on the Board of Directors. In 1925, US Ambassador Tobin 
, 
informed the State Department that van Karnebeek had planned to 
resign his office and become a director [Of the NKPM, but decided 
that he could aid the company more by 'remaining in the cabinet 
for another year. (112) Two years later, van Karnebeck's eldest 
son accepted a position with the St~dard Oil Company of New 
Jersey. (113) 
Simultaneously, certain influential supporters of Royal 
Dutch Shell became dissatisfied with that company or lost power. 
i 
Minister of Colonies de Graaff "an undoubted servant of the Royal 
Dutch" in the State Department's eyes, (114) encountered politi-
cal difficulties; in 1922, Phillips repo~ted that de Graaff had 
I 
"become so unpopualar and unsympathetic :j.n Dutch circles (except-
ing of course the Royal Dutch)" that his reappointment as 
Colonial Minister was doubtful. (115) Several years later, Royal 
Dutch Shell's connections with the Netherlands government suf-
fered another blow. In 1925, Ambassaor Tobin reported that, 
although the new Prime Minister, Colijn, had once been a director 
of Royal Dutch Shell, Colijn had left that firm after "a falling 
i 
out" and was now unfriendly to Royal Dutth concerns. (ll6) 
Because of its political connections and strong networks 
in Holland and the East Indies, Standa~d Oil of New Jersey was 
better informed about developments the oil situation than any 
other American source. After 1923, Jersey Standard invariably 
knew more about the situation in the East Indies than officials 
in Washington. The State Department files on East Indian oil 
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lafter 1923 are largely memoranda noting what the Department had , 
, 
I 
ilearned from various representatives of Jersey Standard. When the 
I 
IState Department needed information 
East Indies, it was Standard Oil of 
I 
or maps of the Netherlands 




(117) State Department officials in the 
1920's recognized the importance of Jersey Standard's work in the 
Netherlands. Just before the granting of concessions to NKPM, 
Ambassador Tobin concluded that Jersey Standard's persistence and 
tactics had played a large role in the Dutch decision. (118) 
Jersey Standard's careful and persistent work was in 
~arked contrast to the efforts of other American companies. At 
iOne time or another, Standard Oil of California, Sinclair Con-
:solidated Oil, the Pure Oil Company, Gulf Oil, and the Texas 
Company all sought concessions in the Netherlands East Indies. 
INone of these firms persisted, however, in their claims to the 
Netherlands government. Representatives of Sinclair Oil travelled 
to the Netherlands in 1920, but failed to impress Dutch officials 
with their seriousness and soon withdrew from negotiations. (119) 
Ambassador Phillips criticized Sinclair's actions as an illustra-
kion of 
the difficulty of the task of American diplomatic 
officers in matters of this kind when the representa-
tives of Americ~D business concerned fail at the last 
moment to take advantage of the favorable situation 
which has been created for them through the efforts of 
the American government. (120) 
The Pure Oil Company also expressed interest in East 




Pure Company withdrew after less than a year. (121) in 1930. Gulf 
i 't 
Oil formed a Dutch subsidiary, Gulf Petroleum Maat$chappij and 
! 
sought concessions in the Netherlands East Indief' {122} Less 
I 
than two years later, however, Gulf abandoned ~ts attempts 
without receiving any concessions. (123) 
Standard Oil of California showed a slightly longer 
attention span. In late 1922, Francis Loomis of Standard of 
, 
California arrived in The Hague to explore the po~sibility of 
securing concessions in the East Indies. (124) But,Standard of 
I 
California never established permanent offices in the Netherlands 
and on at least one occasion officiallY withdrew fro~ the pursuit 
of concessions. (125) Although Standard of Califor~ia exhibited 
intermittent interest in the East Indies throughout the 1920's 
I 
and early 1930's, the company did not form a subsidiary incorpo-
rated under Dutch laws, a necessary preconditionror receiving 
any concessions, until 1930. (126) Standard of Catifornia, in 
contrast witp Jersey Standard, depended upon the State Department 
for information on oil developments in the East Indies. (127) In 
addition, Standard of California invested relatively little in 
East Indian oil. In 1929, Loomis reported that Standard of 
California had invested a total of $75,000 in the Netherlands 
East Indies; four years later that total had climbed to $200,000. 
(128) Standard of California's total investment represented about 
one tenth of what Jersey Standard invested annually. 
There is also some evidenoe of a private understanding 






19120' s. In 1924, Ambassador Tobin 
i 
reported that Standard Oil of , 
Ne~ Jersey and the Royal Dutch Shell group seemed to have 
achieved a rapprochement. (129) Jersey Standard's F.J.E. Horst-
I 
matm confirmed this. "Of late, our relations with the Royal Dutch 
I 
have been very cordial and there have been frequent meetings 
I 
be!tween the representatives of the two companies." (130) NKPM's 
success in the Netherlands East Indies must be viewed in the 
context of international oil agreements. The early 1920's had 
i 
seen fierce competition and price wars between Jersey Standard 
and Royal Dutch Shell; by the end of the decade, both companies 
I 
realized the advantages of cooperation. Simultaneous with NKPM's 
successes in the Netherlands East Indies, Jersey Standard and 
Royal Dutch Shell reached worldwide agreements. In July 1928, the 
"Red Line Agreement" on Middle East oil was signed. This agree-
ment "represented a milestone in the development of cooperative 
relationships between Jersey and Royal Dutch-Shell." Six weeks 
later, in mid-September 1928, Walter Teagle of Jersey Standard • 
and Sir Henri Deterding of Royal Dutch Shell negotiated the 
"Achancarry Agreement" which divided world markets between Jer-
sey, Shell, 
in1ernati 
and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. For the major 
oil companies, the 1 1920's marked the beginning 
of an unprecedented era cooperation. (131) 
Th~ Qhift in Dutch policy after 1928 was not solely due 
to the efforts Jersey Standard, however. The Netherlands 
government had several reasons of its own for altering its 
policy. 
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During the 1920's, Royal Dutch Shell grew increasin41y 
i 
unpopular in the Netherlands and its colonies. In 1921, the 
American consul in Batavia reported that Royal Dutch Shell ~as 
i 
I 
"cordiallY disliked by almost everyone in Netherlands India.: .. 
j 
not connected with it." (132) The Dutch press offered similar 
, 
statements; during the deliberations on the Djambi concessions, 
many editorials deplored the excessive influence of Royal Dutch 
Shell on the Netherlands government. The Hi~ RQ~~~*h~ 
~QY~ worried in October 1921 that Royal Dutch Shell had mQre 
influence in the East Indies than the Ministry of Colonies. 
j 
(133) 
After receiving the Djambi concessions, Royal Dutch Shell 
spurred further popular resentment when the company delayed 
development of these lands. Instead of carrying out work in the 
East Indian fields, Royal Dutch Shell expanded its operations 
elsewhere in the world and demanded significantly reduced taxes 
on oil eA~orted from the East Indies. (134) In response, the 
• 
Netherlands government suspended the oil export tax in the spring 
of 1923. (135) A year later, a revised oil eA~ort tax was pas$ed 
in accordance with Royal Dutch Shell's wishes. (136) Although 
! 
I 
Royal Dutch Shell succeeded in changing the oil export tax, ~he 
I episode triggered another barrage of criticism against the com-
pany's influence. 
Even officials in the Colonial Ministry attacked Royal 
Dutch Shell's privileged position. On several occasions during 
the 1920s, J.H.H. Wamelinck, a subordinate officer of the Nether-




Dutch Shell. Wamelinck attaoked the oompany's virtual fonopoly in 
I '" 
the East Indies, accused Royal Dutch Shell of being coptrolled by 
British interests, and called for the Open Door in, the East 
Indies. (137) 
Tbt=t Nt=ttbt=tt'llU"lda government viewed the arrival of Jersey 
Standard as a counter-balance against strong British ihterests in 
Royal Dutch Shell. The Royal Dutch Shell group was preated in 
1907 when the previously independent Royal Dutch Company merged 
I 
with Shell, a British oil firm. The resulting agreemen~ created a 
company in which Royal Dutch held 60% of the stock: with the 
remaining 40% going to Shell. (138) Despite the apparent pre-
! 
ponderance of Dutch interests in Royal Dutch ShelL it! was widely 
believed British interests actually controlled the company. Henry 
Starrett, the American Consul in Batavia reported tha~ the local 
office of Royal Dutch Shell took no action without prior approval 
of the London office. Royal Dutch Shell's Amsteraam office, 
however, received only monthly reports of developments in the 
East Indies. (139) Some Americans went so far as to call Royal 
Dutch Shell a mere pawn of the British. (140) While that 
represents an extreme view, American leaders genera[ly assumed 
I 
that British interests controlled the Royal Dutch Shelr alliance. 
(141) ! 
Fear of strong British influence on Royal Dutch Shell was 
also present in the Netherlands. Many Dutch officials believed 
that the company's monopoly on East Indian oil threatened Dutch 
neutrality in the event of Anglo-American hostilities., The Nieuw~ 
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EQ!tkI:dam~b.e Qm.u:~t> a leading independent newspaper of the 
day, warned that the exclusion of American interests from the 
Djambi concessions, "irretrievably binds those fields to the 
Royal Dutch Shell group to the practical exclusion of American 
interests." This development, according to the Coyre.ot, imperiled 
Dutch neutrality in the event of an Anglo-American conflict. 
(142) 
There is also some evidence that the Dutch government 
hoped to secure greater American military interest in the Nether- i 
lands East Indies by admitting American oil firms. In 1926, the 
Governor General of the East Indies, de Graeff, informed Am-: 
bassador Tobin of his hope that increased American commercial 
involvement in the colony would result in a greater willingness 
to protect the Indies against aggression. It is clear that the 
Netherlands saw Japan as the principal threat to the §~tu§ £YQ 
in the East Indies, although de Graeff did not say so explicitly. 
Dutch fears of Japanese encroachment into Southeast Asia began as . 
early as World War I. (143) In the 1920's, the Netherlands 
believed "if American and British interests are largely repre-
sented in the Indies, their respective governments ... will i be! 
anxious to protect them and will be correspondingly concerned in 
the maintenance of the §~:tlJ§ guo." (144) 
Another motivation for the change in oil policy was Royal 
Dutch Shell's slow exploitation of its East Indian concessions. 
Even after receiving the Djambi concession, Royal Dutch Shell 
made slow progress. In November 1921, C.O. Spamer, the U,S. 
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! 
Consul in Medan~ Sumatra, reported that the Bataafsche Petroleum 
i 
Matschappij (BP~), Royal Dutch Shell's subsidiary in the East 
Indies, had not yet begun work in the Djambi fields. Spamer 
expected BPM to'begin work during the following year. (145) Two 
! 
years later, however, the situation had changed only slightly. In 
I 
1924, the U.S. Consul at Batavia, Charles Hoover, reported that 
BPM had made little progress in the Djambi exploitation, pri-
marily because the 'company was not trying very hard. (146) At The 
Hague, Ambassador Richard Tobin offered an explanation for BPM's 
sluggishness. Royal Dutch Shell, confident of its monopoly on 
East Indian oil~ was drawing on its holdings elsewhere in the 
world. 
So long as [Royal Dutch Shell's monopoly in the East 
Indies] continues and the company is extracting (large-
ly from American sources) all the oil they need, it may 
quite suit their purpose to leave the Dutch colonial 
field undeveloped. (147) 
These stalling tactics did not go unnoticed. By late 1924, many 
officials in the East Indies were angered at Royal Dutch Shell's 
• 
failure to develop the colony's richest oil fields. (148) As time 
passed, Dutch dissatisfaction mounted. In 1926, several members 
of the Volksr~ad in the Netherlands East Indies publicly com-
, 
plained about. I Royal Dutch Shell's slow progress in the Djambi 
I 
fields. (149) 
An ex~~ination of the production figures for Netherlands 
East Indian oil reveals that these suspicions were well justi-
fied. Between 1913 and 1928, a boom time international oil 
markets, exports of petroleum from the Netherlands East Indies 
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increased very slowly. In 1913, the Indies exported 113 million 
~ 
guilders worth of oil; by 1928, that figure had only risen to 144 
million guilders. (150) (61 p.363) Between 1921 and 1924, the 
Royal Dutch Shell group's crude oil production in the Netherlands 
East Indies rose from 2,295,538 metric tons to 2,819,917 metric 
tons. During the same four year period, however, Royal Dutch 
Shell's total world production jumped from 6,450,933 metric tons 
to 13,388,110. (151) Thus, Royal Dutch Shell's world total rose 
almost three times as quickly as its production in the Nether-
lands East Indies. During the years that Royal Dutch Shell had a 
monopoly on East Indian oil, the relative value of the Dutch 
colony's oil imports actually declined. In 1913 oil exports 
accounted for 16.9% of all exports from the Netherlands East 
Indies. By 1928, the last year before Standard entered the field, 
oil had fallen to only 9.1% of East Indian imports. (152) 
The numbers strongly support the contention that Royal 
Dutch Shell kept its oil production in the East Indies to a 
• 
minimum, choosing instead to draw on holdings elsewhere in the 
world. The stalling tactics, however, were contrary to the wishes 
of the Netherlands government. The Colonial Ministry planned to 
use oil revenues to fund social programs in the Netherlands East 
Indies. During the discussion of the Djambi concessions in the 
States General in 1920 and 1921, several deputies of the Second 
House urged a rapid settlement so that the government could begin 
to enjoy the new revenues generated by the oil industry, (153) In 
the mid-1920's, the Dutch government embarked on a sweeping 
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program to improve the standard of living of the native popu-
lation in the Indies. 154) To finance projects in education. 
sanitation, and road construction, the government relied in. part 
on revenues from oil exploitation. Royal Dutch Shell's slow 
development of the Djambi concessions therefore retarded the 
Colonial Government's social programs. Some observers have argued 
that royalties paid by foil companies were the key to advances 
eventually made in native living conditions during the 1920's and 
1930's. (155) 
Contemporary Dutch observers were also aware of the 
potential value of American investment. In 1921, an editorial in 
H§t Ni§~~ ygn ~ n~, a Batavia newspaper, questioned the 
wisdom of excluding American oil interests from the Djambi 
concessions. 
Whether the Government has acted wisely by yielding to 
the will of the Royal Dutch still remains to be seen. 
The consumer certainly does not profit by it. The 
resources of the Standard would no doubt have meant an 
influx' of American capital which here would have found 
profitable investment. (156) 
Dutch colonial officials were also aware of the importance of 
American investment. In 1922, the Director of Finance of the 
Colonial Government I wrot~e, "we oan hardly expeot Amerioa to 
oontinue to loan us money unless Amerioan interests reoeive 
sympathetio and substantial enoouragements in this oountry." 
(157) One year earlier, the Guaranty Trust Company of New 
extended a $100 million loan to the Netherlands East Indies. The 
State Department, however, refused to link oonsideration of 
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future loans with concessions for American oil firms in the East 
Indies. (158) 
The entrance of NKPM into the East Indian oil fields also 
provided direct social benefits for the population. The con-
cession agreements required the oil companies to employ sizeable 
numbers of natives. Thus, American companies were compelled to 
train Indonesians for skilled positions in oil exploration, 
engineering, and bookkeeping. (159) NKPM's work in the East 
Indies also resulted in improved cold storage facilities for meat 
and produce; additional hospital beds; primary schooling for the 
children of employees in both Malay and Dutch; better housing, 
sanitation, and laundry facilities; new roads and bridges; and 
the introduction of telephone service to many regions. (160) 
Thus, the Dutch government had important reasons of its 
own for granting concessions to NKPM. The growing unpopularity of 
Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands, concern for the strategic 
ramifications of excessive British influence on the company, and 
need for revenues from oil sales all combined to make the 
entrance of NKPM into the East Indies attractive to the Dutch 
government. These factors, coupled with Standard Oil of New 
Jersey's persistence and careful cultivation of political support 
in the Netherlands, offer sufficient reason to discard the 
prevailing view 
the 
that American oil diplomacy won an important 
East Indies. Even after 1928, the Open Door was victory in 
never really achieved. Other American oil firms were unable to 
repeat Jersey Standard's success. The State Department's argu-
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I 
ments were weak. Not only did the Dutch prove unreceptive to 
i ~ 
Washington's Open Door appeals, qut American retaliation against 
i 
Royal Dutch Shell in the United States also had little impact. 
i 
i 
Regardless of effectiv~ness, the 1920's marked a new 
highpoint of United States involvement in Southeast Asia. Before 
World War I, America's primary interest in the region was as a 
market for U.S. exports. During the 1920's, American merchants 
continued to find buyers for their goods in Southeast Asia, but a 
, 
new concern dwarfed the importance of these sales. For the first 
time, the United States recognized the significance of imports 
i 
from Southeast Asia. Earlier trajde had dealt largely in luxury 
goods; now, however, American interest centered on oil, the 
lifeblood of modern industry. American interests in the region 
I 
remained primarily economic, but oil's economic importantance 
represented only part of its value to the United States. Oil's 
role in U.S. defense also factored in American thinking, es-
pecially in the early 1920's. By the end of the decade, however, 
• 
the discovery of new oil reserves in the United States reduced 
these security concerns. 
As American interests 
ernment involvement also rose. 
ip Southeast Asia increased, gov-
Be~ore 1918, United States busi-
I 
nessmen pursued their goals in Southeast Asia with little State 
Department support. After the end of the war, however, Washington 
actively promoted American business interests in the region. As a 
result, the State Department took bolder positions. Actions like 
the declaration of the Netherlands as a "non-reciprocating" 
3 
nation would never have happened in earlier times. AlthouFh 
Washington's efforts at oil diplomacy were ineffective. they did 
represent an unprecedented U.S. concern for the region. 
Conditions in Southeast Asia itself had relatively little 
impact on American policy decisions. The impetus for both Wash-
ington's new oil diplomacy and that activism's eventual decline 
lay in America itself. Southeast Asia became important only when 
the United States began to fear that its domestic oil reserves 
were exhausted. The panic passed after Americans found new oil 
fields at home in the mid-1920's. When the oil crisis no longer 
threatened in the immediate future, State Department efforts 
waned. While the discovery of new oil deposits in the United 
States temporarily alleviated the problem, it was obviously not 
an enduring solution. At some point in the future, America would 
once again need to search abroad for new oil reserves. The State 
Department's abandonment of aggressive oil diplomacy as soon as 
the crisis passed revealed lack of foresight and long range 
planning. This failure to look beyond the immediate dilemma would 
continue to plague American involvement in Southeast Asia in the 
future. 
The 1920's was an important decade for American policy in 
Southeast Asia. For the first time, the U.S. government took an 
active role in the region. The treatment of American oil compa-
nies in the Netherl East Indies was the central issue of the 
decade. The State Department's decision to base its case on the 




remained America's principal interes~ in Southeast Asia. At least 
briefly, however, the role of East Indian oil in American defense 
had also been considered. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Rise of Military and Secu~ity Concerns. 
The threat lof Japanese expansion onto the Asian mainland 
triggered another important shift in American Southeast Asian 
policy in the late 1930's. The objectives of American diplomacy 
moved from primaril~ economic considerations towards a new con-
cern for militaryimatters. This change in United States policy 
was not as abrupt o~ dramatic as the one of 1918-1920. While the 
, 
i 
beginnings of Ameri¢an oil diplomacy in 1919 were apparent even 
i 
to contemporary observers, the shift in objectives in the 1930's 
was relatively subtle and elusive. The new policy that emerged in 
the 1930's was n9thing radically new. It simply changed the 
priorities of the earlier period. 
It is diffiQult to pinpoint an exact beginning to this 
new stage in American policy. This is due in part to the 
considerable overlap in the objectives of the twenties and 
thirties. It would be wrong to say that American policy had no 
security concerns in the 1920's and no economic ones a decade 
I 
later. The change wis far more subtle than that. It represented a 
shift in the relative importance of economic and security con-
cerns, rather than. the pursuit of any fundamentally new objec-
tive. The turning point was further obscured by the fact that in 
the early 1930's there was very little American policy towards 
Southeast Asia at all. Owing to the Great Depression, the United 
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States simply paid little attention to developments in the 
region. Ultimately. however, it is not crucial to affix a precise 
cut-off date. The new security-conscious policy was certainly in 
evidence by 1937. To quibble over whether military and security 
concerns began to supplant the earlier focus on economic objec-
tives in 1932 or 1934 lends little light to the subject. Although 
the shift in policy is hard to define precisely, its longterm 
implications for American policy proved very important. 
Southeast Asia's raw materials remained America's primary 
interest in the region in the 1930's. The reasons for these 
resources' importance, however, changed dramatically. The United 
States moved away from its earlier rhetorical emphasis on the 
Open Door; Southeast Asian raw materials' value to the American 
\ 
economy was now downplayed. Instead, the U.S. stressed the 
importance of these raw materials to global security and American 
defense interests. Before the 1930's, oil, rubber, and tin in the 
Netherlands East Indies were viewed as ingredients necessary for 
the insured prosperity of the American economy. In the late 
1930's, however, the region's products had taken on a far more 
significant role. In 1921, Secretary of State Hughes had called 
the East Indies suppliers of resources "indispensable to the life 
and prosperity" of the United States; (1) twenty years later, 
however, the Dutch colony had become the "arsenal of strategic 
raw materials for the democracies", in the words of a State 
Department memorandum. (2) 




east Asia's importanoe to Amerioan national seourity; military 
i 
oonsiderations rose to jnew prominenoe in U.S. thinking. Although 
military and seouritt oonoerns had been present in earlier 
I 
Amerioan involvement iq the region, they had never before played 
such a central role. In the 1920's, United States involvement in , 
Southeast Asia had qentered on the Open Door. The official 
arguments for American.interest in the oil fields of the Nether-
lands East Indies wer~ based on the principle of equal eoonomic 
opportunity. American: eoonomic interests in the region were 
stressed above all oth~r considerations. 
It would be ~rong, however, to suggest that strategic 
concerns had not been 'present before the 1930's and that after 
that time economic qonsiderations played no role in Amerioan 
decision-making. The istrategic value of oil and other natural 
resources had, of cour~e, been an integral part of the upsurge in 
American interest in Squtheast Asia in the 1920's. Indeed, the 
value of oil to the United States military was one of the 
prinoipal motives behind the newly assertive oil diplomacy after 
World War One. Military considerations never played the dominant 
role in the 1920' s, ! however. American diplomatic appeals were 
I 
I 
phrased in terms of ec~nomic reciprocity. 
i 
Just as the new emphasis on military concerns had origins 
in the policies of the 1920's, the overriding economic interests 
of the 1920's continued to influence United States policy in the 
1930's. Where oil had once dominated the stage, rubber became the 
center of American attention in the 1930's. Military and security 
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concerns held sway in the 1930's, but concern for the 
remained an active element in American policy. 
Open Door 
~ 
This chapter examines the gradual shift from economic to 
security concerns, First, the continuities in American policy are 
outlined. This portion of the chapter focuses on the U.S. 
response to the international rubber cartel formed during the 
1930's. The next section examines the rise of military and 
security concerns, and the reasons for that development. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of American involvement in 
Southeast Asia as of the eve of Pearl Harbor. 
Although important changes occurred during the 1930's, 
United States policy did not undergo a complete transformation. 
Traditional economic objectives continued to play an important 
role in American involvement in Southeast Asia. Rubber replaced 
oil as America's principal economic interest in the region. (3) 
By the late 1920's. access to foreign oil had lost its grip on 
the attention of the United States government . 
• 
Several factors account for this decline in American 
concern for Southeast Asian oil. First, the discovery of new oil 
fields within the United States relieved earlier fears that 
American oil reserves faced imminent depletion. Estimated crude 
oil reserves nearly doubled between 1918 and 1929. Discoveries of 
new oil fields in Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
California spurred a boom in American oil production. Total U.S. 
crude oil production jumped from 355,928,000 barrels in 1918 to 
1,007,323,000 barrels in 1929, a sixty-five percent increase. 
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During that same period, crUde production in California, Okla-
homa, and Texas more than tripled. (4) Growth in domestic 
production continued to outpace increasing American oil consump-
, 
tion. (5) By the late 1920's, the oil scare that had electrified 
Americans ten years earlier seemed unimportant. 
Given abundant domestic oil production, it is not sur-
prising that American diplomatic efforts on behalf of oil com-
panies declined sharply. The State Department's refusal to recog-
nize that American oil companies continued to face discrimination 
in the Netherlands East In~ies in the 1930's emphasized this loss 
I 
! 
of interest. Flushed with the great triumph of Jersey Standard's 
1928 concessions in the Indies, United States diplomats simply 
ignored further calls to action. In the State Department's 
opinion the case was close~; American companies had been granted 
equal opportunity in the Dutch colony, After 1928, Washington 
extended little aid to American oil companies in the Netherlands 
East Indies, despite evidence of continued discrimination. 
, 
The experiences of Francis Loomis of Standard Oil of 
California furnish the best example. During the 1930's, Loomis 
repeatedly informed the S~ate Department of Dutch discrimination 
against his company. Memo~anda of conversations with Loomis in 
I 
the State Department records indicate that Loomis was quite 
forceful in his pleas for assistance, losing his temper on more 
than one occasion. Despite Loomis' efforts and statements from 
Dutch colonial officials that strongly supported his contentions, 
the State Department consistently refused to take action. (6) In 
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1932. Laurits Swenson, United States Ambassador at The Hague. 
advised that the State Department not interpret the Dutoh de-
oision to deny concessions to California Standard as a violation 
of reciprocity. Swenson urged that the matter not even be 
mentioned to the Netherlands government as that would "only cause 
irritation." (7) 
As oil declined in importance, foreign rubber,supplies 
achieved a new significance for Americans. Because the North 
American climate effectively prevents rubber cultivation, the 
United States had always depended on imported rubber. The great 
bulk of the world's rubber was grown in Southeast Asia. In 1922, 
three-quarters of world rubber production came from Malaya and 
the Dutch East Indies. (8) The East Indies alone aocounted for 
37% of world rubber production in 1938. (9) Thus, Amerioan 
concern for rubber supplies quite naturally focused on Southeast 
Asia. While foreign rubber had always been important to the 
United States, it acquired a new significance in the 1920's and 
1930's. American demand for rubber rose dramatically during the 
1920's. As was the case with oil, the proliferation of auto-
mobiles was a key factor in increased consumption. Even in the 
1920's, United States demand for foreign rubber was increasing. 
Events of the early 1930's provided a catalyst for even greater 
American awareness of foreign rubber. 
The formation of the International Rubber Regulation 
Committee (I.R.R.C.) in 1933 forced the United States to confront 
the international rubber situation. The I.R.R.C. was a cartel 
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representing British, French, and 







rubber producers. The 
world rubber prices 
which had plummeted during the l~te 1920's. (10) Attempts at 
I 
regulation of world rubber produc~ion were not new. In 1921, 
i 
British rubber producers had agreed ~o a similar scheme, the 
"Stevenson Plan" > which sought to r~ise rubber prices by estab-
lishing production quotas. The Stevenson Plan was intitiated and 
directed by the British government, Winston Churchill, then in 
the British Colonial Office, was esp~cially vocal in his support 
of the scheme. Initially, world ru~ber prices rose sharply in 
i 
response to production quotas and 4 stiff increase in Malaya's 
rubber export duties. By 1925, prices :had reached a peak of $1. 25 
per pound. (11) The United State~, with its rapidly growing 
i 
demand for rubber, felt this price ju~p sharply. (12) 
The United States responded i to the price hikes with 
protests to the British government. Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover declared that the Stevenson Plan was in restraint of 
international trade. (13) In addition to official proclamations 
of disapproval, the Commerce Department encouraged domestic rub-
ber conservation and promoted rubbe~ production in non-British 
! 
territories. (14) The Stevenson Plan !ultimately failed, however, 
! 
due to the non-participation of rubber growers in the Netherlands 
East Indies. As world rubber prices ,rose, East Indian rubber 
production expanded to flood the international markets and prices 
fell to disastrously low levels. By 1928, world rubber prices had 
been driven back down to seventeen cents per pound. (15) In the 
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faoe of this failure, the Stevenson Plen was abandoned in 1928. 
The expansion of East Indian rubber production should not 
h~ ~:i:,-I:;.t<ihut~d to the United St.ates policy of promoting non-
British rubber sources. The Dutch growers were simply responding 
to the economic opportunity presented them by inflated world 
rubber prices. In the end, American programs had little impact on 
t.he eventual collapse of the Stevenson Plan. (16) 
After the failure of the Stevenson Plan in 1928, world 
rubber prices remained at disastrously low levels. (17) The 
international depression sharply reduced demand for rubber, but 
production did not. decline. In response, rubber producers banded 
together in a new attempt to oontrol production and stabilize 
prices. The I.R.R.C., formed in 1933, was far more sweeping than 
its predecessor. Unlike the Stevenson Plan, the I.R.R.C had no 
formal connection with any government; it was an organization of 
private business interests. In addition to British growers, the 
new cartel included Dutch rubber planters as well. Thus, the 
scope of the l.R.R.C. removed one of the principal causes for the 
Stevenson Plan's failure. As a further guarantor of success, the 
l.R.R.C. included French rubber interests in Indochina, although 
that colony'S rubber production was negligble at the time. The 
participation of Indochina in the I.R.R.C. insured that Indochina 
would not expand its rubber plantations. (18) In this respect, 
the I.R.R.C. succeeded; Indochinese rubber production remained 
undeveloped throughout the 1930's. (19) 




due to the fact that the! l.R.R.C. was a 
r 
i 
the American government'~ opposition was 
" , 
even less forceful than it had been to the Stevepson plan. (20) 
I 
I 
Despite the fact that negotiations to form a ~ubber cartel had 
begun at least three years earlier, the State Department took no 
action until only a few weeks before the l.R.R.C. agreement was 
finally signed in December 1933. (21) Even at th~t late date, the 
State Department limited its involvement to polite requests to be 
kept informed of any developments. Acting Secretary of State 
I 
William Phillips' instruction to the American ambassador at The 
I 
Hague just before the l.R.R.C. agreement was, finalized, was 
typically restrained. 
Kindly inform (the Netherlands Government3 that the 
American Government has a very great interest in any 
plan that may be worked out since the United States is 
by far the greatest consumer of rubber. Please ask for 
any further information that may be available as to the 
plans. (22) 
The State Department took no firm stand on the matter. Thus, it 
is hardly surprising that the State Department accomplished very 
little for American rubber consumers. (23) 
After the creation of the l.R.R.C., State Department 
activity gradually increased. By late 1934, Am~rican diplomats 
I 
requested the inclusion of consumer interests inlthe l.R.R.C. In 
addition, the State Department asked the l.R.R.C. to establish a 
maximum price level. (24) The United States sought the assistance 
of both the Dutch and British governments in achieving this end. 
The Netherlands proved relatively helpful; government officials 
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used their influence to urge the Dutch members of the I.R.R.C. to 
'" 
honor American requests. The British government, however, offered 
no such assistance. (25) The I.R.R.C. offered to create an 
advisory committee of three non-voting consumer representatives. 
Secretary of State Hull rejected this offer as insufficient. (26) 
Eventually, however, a compromise agreement on consumer 
representation in the I.R.R.C. was reached. This agreement, 
however. was not adequate to insure America ample rubber supplies 
at a reasonable price. In 1936, the United States was still 
i attempting to persuade the I. R. R. C. to expand world rubber 
production. The State Department funneled its protests through 
the Consumer Panel of the I.R.R.C., rather than attempting direct 
government action. (27) These protests proved ineffective, how-
ever, (28) and in early 1937, the State Department entered 
negotiations with the I.R.R.C. directly. American diplomats again 
worked in cooperation with Dutch officials. (29) These efforts 
proved successful; in 1937 the I.R.R.C. agreed to raise the 
• 
rubber production quota. (30) 
There are several reasons for the mild American response 
to the I.R.R.C. First, rubber production quotas were implemented 
only gradually. Thus, the United States did not feel the impact 
of the I.R.R.C. until several years after its creation. World 
rubber prices did not increase appreciably until 1936 - three 
years after the establishment of the I.R.R.C. (31) This strategy 
of gradual change lulled American rubber consumers into a false 




ly as the impact of the I.R.R.C. was felt. in 1936. Secondi, U.S. 
I 
military planners were largely unaware of the vulnerabil!ity of 
America's crude rubber supply, {SS} Despite America's nea:r total 
I 
dependence on Southeast Asian rubber, the creation 
R.C. did not trouble the War Department's Planning 
I 
of the 1. R. -
I 
Branch. (34) 
Domestic considerations also restrained State Dep;artment 
actions. Strong isolationist sentiment forced the State ~epart-
ment to respond cautiously. (35) Those government officials that 
I 
I 
did speak publicly of rubber's importance to American industrial 
i 
and defense needs faced a nation "dead set against anythi~g that 
smacked of war, militarism, and foreign involvements. Of (3~3) The 
catastrophe of the Great Depression also weakened the U.S. 
response to the l.R.R.C. The Roosevelt administration avoided 
promoting controversial foreign policies which might ehdanger i 
smooth passage of domestic legislation. (37) American concentra-
tion on the threat of domestic chaos prevented "the format1ion of 
any suitable policy with regard to the l.R.R.C. in 1934 and 
1935." (38) The Depression also made Washington more sympathetic 
to protectionist measures. The U.S. had given tacit approval to 
production and marketing controls at the World Econom~c Con-
I 
ference of 1933. In addition, America itself had adopted ~roduc-
tion quotas (on wheat and silver among other commodities) in an 
effort to revive the economy. (39) 
There are several important parallels between the Ameri-
can response to the l.R.R.C. in the 1930's and U.S. oil diplomacy 






economic Igoals. While American planners were aware of the stra-
I 
tegic va]ue of oil and rubber to the United States, it was never 
I 
I 
more than a secondary concern. The State Department emphasized 
i 
the pea~etime economic importance of the two commodities. The 
U.S. did not claim that its efforts on behalf of American oil and 
\ 
rubber interests in Southeast Asia represented a defense of 
national tsecurity. Instead, the State Department based its argu-
ments od the ideal of equal economic opportunity. U.S. oil 
diplomacy and opposition to the international rubber cartel 
stemmed ifrom the same source: a belief in unrestricted inter-
national trade. In the 1920's, Dutch oil policy violated the 
principl~ of the Open Door. American oil diplomacy was a clear 
cut defetise of equal access. In the case of rubber, however, the 
United States faced a different problem. In American eyes, the 
I. R. R. C .. consti tuted unfair cooperation between rubber producers, 
an obviqus violation of the free market. The cartel's actions 
resulted in inflated world rubber prices which harmed American 
consumer interests. Thus, in the cases of both oil and rubber, 
the United States protested obstacles to free trade. Although the 
specific Iviolations of the free market involved were different in 
I 
each ca~e, the fundamental argument was the same. The United 
States o~posed agreements that discriminated against the inter-
ests of American producers and consumers. 
American opposition to the l.R.R.C. also exhibited clear 
tactical similarities with the oil diplomacy of the 1920's. In 
both instances, the U.S. was slow to start and progressed very 
97 
I 
cautiously. In 1920, the State Department made no representat~ons 
to the Dutch government until a bill granting the Djambi pon-
I 
cessions to Royal Dutch Shell was already before the Est~tes 
i 
I 
General. In the early 1930's, Washington remained silent during 
the long negotiations to establish an international rubber ~ar-
tel. Even after the l.R.R.C.'s formation, the State Departbent 
! 
i 
took no firm position for several years, until price increases 
I 
I 
shocked Washington into action. Had the U.S. intervened soober, 
I 
its efforts in both cases could well have proved more effectiive. 
The State Department's involvement remained hes i tant; the Unli ted 
I 
States was reluctant to act decisively, The American willinghess 
I 
to seek private settlements of both the oil and rubber iS$ues 
I 
I 
exhibited this tendency. U.S. diplomats were content to remaip in 
the background and let private American interests attemp~ to 
reach an agreement. During the Djambi negotiations in 1920, 
I 
Ambassador Phillips accepted the Dutch offer of private nego~ia-
tions between Royal Dutch Shell and American oil firms. This 
preference for private action, with tacit government support, as 
opposed to direct diplomatic representations was also discernible 
i during the rubber controversy. After largely ignoring the II. R.-
I 
R.C. for the first years of its existence, the State Depart~ent 
i 
first opted to pursue a solution through private channels. bnly 
after that strategy had fai led did American diplomats themse:l ves 
step in. The similarity of the U.S. approach to the problems of 
oil in the 1920's and rubber in the 1930's is hardly surprising; 





involved in! both oases. 
i 
It ~ould be wrong, however to foous only on the oon-
tinuity Of) Amerioan interest in Southeast Asian raw materials. 
I 
! 




only part of the picture. There were other, new concerns 
I 
that shapea. U. S. policy beginning in the 1930's. Increasingly, 
American di~lomats focused on military and strategic concerns. 
The importance of the colonies of Southeast Asia to American 
security was no longer limited to their production of vital raw 
materials. Instead, the region assumed a new importance in 
American military planning. 
By the mid-1930's, developments in Europe and Japan 
compelled the United States to closely heed the situation in 
Southeast Asia. The possibility of Japanese expansion into the 
region had been long considered. Officials in the Netherlands 
Foreign Ministry had already discussed the possibility in the 
early 1920's. American concern for a Japanese advance into the 
Netherlands East Indies dated back at least to 1933, when both 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Joseph Grew, the American 
Ambassador to Japan, warned of the possibility of Japan seizing 
the Dutch crlony. (40) 
Ametican concern for the military situation in Southeast 
Asia increased rapidly following the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese in 1937. (41) Japan's rise implied a threat to the 
status quo in Southeast Asia. Many Americans saw the move onto 




plan of Japanese eArpansion. These views were not unwarrantedl; 
many contemporary Japanese leaders saw the war in China in jus~ 
I 
such terms. In their eyes, Japan's success in China would depen~ 
i 
upon control over French Indochina. This, in turn, would ne~essii-
, 
tate Japanese influence in Thailand. The "logical capstone" 
I 
qf 
this expansion would be Japanese control of the Netherlands Eas,t 
Indies. (42) 
The prospect of a Japanese controlled Southeast Asila 
I 
I 
greatly troubled American leaders. The Netherlands East Indieis 
i 
i remained the focus of U. S. concern. As noted earlier, the greateir 
, 
abundance of natural resources in the East Indies made them mor,e 
, 
significant than the other territories of Southeast Asia. (43) In 
f 
addition, the Indies were situated to control important Pacifi'c 
i 
shipping lanes. Japanese seizure of the Netherlands East Indies 
would threaten the United States by shutting off supplies of 
vital raw materials, endangering American military bases in tbe 
Philippines, impeding communications with the Far and Middle 
East, and slowing American aid to China. (44) 
the 
cerns 





the new emphasis on military cod-
in French Indochina as weIll. 
I 
i 
Whereas Indochina had been neither an important market for 
American goods nor a major supplier of vital raw materials, tQe 
rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930's made the French colony 
an important strategic concern. Some State Department officials 




were hardly the chief American concern. (45) GeOgraphicall~; the 
i 
French colony was situated to serve as a possible staging!ground 
! 




(46) Although Indochina still held little intrinsic value 
United States. it occupied an increasingly prominent 
within the conteA~ of American-Japanese relations as' a:whole. 
(47) French Indochina's new importance illustrates the ch4nge in 
American objectives well. In the 1920's, when American concerns 
were primarily economic, the French colony received scant atten-
tion. With the rise of Japan in the 1930's, however, the I,United 
States broadened its perspective to include Indochina, too.' 
Events in Asia explain the increase in American s~curity 
interests only partially; equally important were developments in 
Europe. The rise of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy unde~scored 
the importance of Southeast Asia to the United States. American 
policy in Southeast Asia was heavily influenced by the European 
I 
situation. As a European war became increasingly likely, diplo-
• 
mats realized anew the importance of Southeast Asian resources to 
the Western powers. The Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-
china, and British holdings in Malaya and Singapore were iessen-
tial to the continued strength of Western Europe. Thus, 
United States moved into an alliance with Britain and 





saw the , 
necessity of protecting European interests in Southeast Asia. 
In effect, a long chain of interests was created. The 




against the Nasi menaoe was oruoial to the ooqtinued viability of 
I 
American international objeotives l both econo~io and ideologioal. 
Great Britain, in turn, depended upon supplies from its colonies 
I 
and the Netherlands East Indies. Indirectly tijen, British access 
to Southeast Asia became a priority for Ametican planners. The 
, 
final link in the chain was that the securityjof the East Indies 
and Malaya depended upon continued French control of Indochina, 
i 
for if the Japanese were to occupy the French!colony, they would 
be poised for an attack on the rest of So~theast Asia. Thus, 
American interest in protecting Indochina wa~ ultimately due to 
i 
concern for British security. (48) Japan: had to be stopped 
"before it hindered the war effort against Germany by slicing 
across Great Britain's lifelines to the Orient... (49) Four days 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a State Department memorandum 
summarized American interests. 
then, 
Because of its strategic geographical PQsition and the 
possession of raw materials (such as rubber, tin, and 
petroleum) vital to the defense efforts of the United 
States. and the war efforts of the Allies, [Southeast 
Asia] holds a major position in deliberations on the 
ominous crisis in the Orient. (50) 
The American task in the late 1930's and early 1940's, 
, 
was to block Japanese moves to the South and insure the 
I 
status quo in Southeast Asia. Inadequate military strength great-
ly hampered the U.S. pursuit of its new strategic interests in 
Southeast Asia. The United States Navy was simply not prepared to 
take a strong position in the Pacific. The cause of this weakness 
was rooted in the naval disarmament agreements signed in Washing-
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ton in 1923. After the signing of these agreements, large scale 
naval action in the Pacific was beyond American resources. (51) 
The "Europe-first" strategy - the decision to place American 
interests in Europe above all others - which was adopted 'well 
before the United States actually entered the war, further 
reduced American military options in the Pacific. (52) 
American leaders, military and civilian alike, were well 
aware that the United States was not strong enough to enforce its 
policies militarily in Southeast Asia. U.S. military weakness was 
the crucial limiting factor in pre-war diplomacy. America had to 
base its entire policy on the realization that if war came to 
Southeast Asia in the late 1930s, the United States would be 
unable to take effective action. (53) In the absence of suf-
ficient naval strength, American opposition to Japanese expansion 
took on a moralistic tone. Lacking the strength to stop Japan 
outright, the United States based its opposition on the decaying 
treaty structure of the 1920's and the hope that international 
public condemnation of Japanese aggression would deter further 
advances. (54) 
Above all else, American policy in Asia sought to avoid 
conflict; the U.S. strategy was based on buying time. No actions 
should be taken that would impel Japan towards war. While the 
State Department worked to stall the Japanese advance, military 
leaders sought to rebuild American strength. (55) The process, 
however, was a slow one, retarded further by domestic political 
considerations. The findings of the Nye Commission were fresh in 
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the minds of the American public; fear that 
lead to another war made many reluctant to 
exPenditures. President Franklin Roosevelt told 
I 





has son Elliott, 
j 
"We're appeasing Japan in order to gain the timel we have to have 
to build a first rate navy, a first rate army." d56) 
i 
At first, the United States strengthened its military 
position in Asia by redeploying the forces at its disposal. In 




United States to Hawaii to allow more fr~edom of action 
against Japan. Although the impact of this move was probably 
minimal, it represented the major prewar militar¥ decision con-
cerning American policy towards the Netherlands East Indies. In 
early 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark cabled 
Admiral Richardson, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, "Why are you 
in the Hawaiian Area? Answer: You are there because of the 
deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on 
the Japs going into the East Indies." (57) Air power also emerged 
as an attractive, relatively inexpensive means of shoring up 
American defenses in Asia. Military planners envisioned a squad-
ron of airpl~~es in the Philippines not only as a means of 
I 
defending I those islands, but also as a threat t~ Japan itself. 
I 
(58) Many officials _in Washington assumed that Japan would 
I 
quickly back down in the face of such a threat. Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson believed that "clear language and bold actions" 
would force the Japanese to realize the dangers of conflict with 
the United States. (59) In 1940, however, the United States was 
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not prepared to take a firm stance. American leaders had not yet 
determined how the U.S. would respond to a Japanese advance. As 
Stark bluntly told Richardson in May, "Suppose the Japs do go 
into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer 
to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God;s 
igreen earth who can tell you." (60) 
Events of 1939-1940 made the situation more acute. In 
:February 1939, Japan occupied the island of Hainan. One month 
later, Tokyo claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Both 
of these moves hinted at further expansion into Southeast Asia. 
(61) The rapid German victories in Europe in early 1940 disrupted 
the balance of power in Asia. With France and the Netherlands 
defeated and Great Britain struggling for survival, the colonial 
'powers could no longer adequately defend their Asian possessions. 
The chances of Japanese expansion had increased. (62) In Sep-
tember 1940, the Japanese entered northern Indochina. (63) One 
week later, Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact. 
Although the alliance ultimately served little purpose, it pro-
vided further impetus for American concern about the Asian 
isituation. (64) 
The United States responded with increased economic pres-
sures against Japan. American leaders had long considered trade 
sanctions and embargoes on oil, steel and other commodities 
central to the Japanese war effort. The most important of these 
measures was an embargo on sales of American oil to Japan. 




however. because Japan might respond to any emba.rgoe$ by siezing 
I 
control of the resource rich colonies of Southeast Asia. 
I 
The idea of an oil emba.rgo originated with I American oil 
I 
executives looking for a negotiating tool against th~ creation of 
I 




an embargo as a psychological bargaining tool in inegotiations 
with the Japanese. At the time, the idea found little favor in 
Washington. (65) Serious consideration of an oil : embargo re-
emerged, however, in 1939. In July of that year1 the United 
States informed Japan that the Treaty of Commerce a.bd Navigation 
I 
signed in 1911 would be terminated in six months. 
! 
(66) In 
December, Washington announced an embargo on sales bf high grade 
aviation gasoline. (67) This embargo and more extensive ones on 
steel scrap, lead, and a wide range of petroleum products 
announced in June and July of 1940 had relatively l~ttle impact 
on Japan's ability to procure these materials.; The embargo 
defined aviation fuel so strictly that Japan simply switched to 
purchasing gasoline with a slightly lower octane level that was 
still perfectly usable. Japan continued to purchase aviation fuel 
in large quantities from the United States. American! leaders were 
I 
I 
aware that the definition of aviation fuel in the I act allowed 
Japan to buy as much gasoline as it needed. Hull repeatedly 
blocked efforts by other officials. American and! British. to 
close the loopholes in the embargo, fearing that a more forceful 
stance might provoke a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East 
Indies. (68) Thus, the early American embargoes were essentiallY 
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I 
s~bolic. serving only to alert Japan and the American public as 
i
l 
tOlthe U.S. position. 
Threatened with the loss of American oil, Japan sought to , 
! 
bulild closer economic ties with the Netherlands East Indies. 
During the summer of 1940, oil executives met with Japanese 
re~resentatives to negotiate a trade agreement. Initially, Japan 
demanded annual sales of 1,000,000 tons of crude oil. For East 
Indian oil producers, this was a staggering figure; it repre-
, 
se~ted nearly double the existing trade volume. As negotiations 
continued, Japan raised its demands 
:, . " 
i .'1 
1940 ~y requested 3,150,000 tons 
I A 
even further; in September of 
annually - three times the~ 
initial demand. (69) Ultimately, a compromise of 1,849,500 tons 
was reached. Japan accepted this lower figure because available 
I 
shipping was insufficient to carry larger quantities from the 
East Indies to Japan. As it was, even the compromise figure was 
too much for Japanese tanker capabilities. Durin~~the first nine 
months of the agreement, Japan was able to nly half of the 
• promised amount. (70) 
Negotiations between Japan and the United States con-
ti~ued throughout 1941. Tensions now centered on Japanese in-
, 
vOfvement in China and the Tripartite Pact. The United States 
! 
pu~hed Japan to pull back on both fronts. The issue of access to 
resources in the Netherlands East Indies was not a direct 
concern. Both sides wanted to preserve free trade with the Indies 
for as long as possible. Both countries joined in tenuous support 




tant only insofar as American economic sanctions ~esigned to 
persuade the Japanese to change their stance on China pushed 
Japan towards the seizure of the Dutch colony. (72) 
I 
On July 14 1941, the United States, having bro~en Japan 1 s 
diplomatic code, intercepted a telegram from Japanesb military 
officials in Canton to Tokyo. "After the occupation of French 
Indo-China, next on our schedule is. " the Netherlands Indies." 
(73) On t.he t.wenty-first,., Japanese troops moved into southern 
1 
Indochina. Washington's worst fears were confirmed. i Four days 
1at.el" the Uni t.ed St.at.es responded with stiffer emb~rgoes and 
i 
froze Japanese assets in America. (74) In Washington,; advocates 
of a hard line against Japan, like Stimson, Morgenthau, Ickes, 
and the St.ate Department's Stanley Hornbeck gained strength. 
American leaders despaired of reaching an agreement with Japan 
and adopted an increasingly inflexible position, confident that 
, 
Japan would back down in the face of firm resistance.' In August 
1941, Roosevelt rejected Japanese Prime Minister Konoye's offer 
• 
of a summit meeting. The President acted on the advice of 
Hornbeck, who warned that acceptance of the offer would be 
i 
I construed as evidence of American weakness. (75) 
I 
The tougher stance did not reflect any chbnge in the 
! 
American military position in the Pacific. The Navy was still too 
weak to effectively oppose Japanese advances into Southeast Asia. 
The United States had begun ferrying heavy bombers to the 
Philippines in July, 1941. American leaders greeted the move 
enthusiatically. In the words of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 
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I 
"Fronk being impotent to influence events in that area, we 
I 
suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great 
effeqtive power." (76) Such enthusiasm, however, was unwarranted. 
Whil~ progress had been made, U.S. forces in the Philippines 
remained inadequate; more time was needed. American planners 
beli~ved that by mid-December 1941 American air and submarine 
forces in the Philippines would become a viable threat to 
Japanese operations south of Formosa. By March 1942, the US 
I 
envisioned a force in the Philippines sufficient to deter Japan-
i 
ese ~xpansion into areas South and West of the Philippines. (77) 
Gene~al Marshall declared in November of 1941, that 
the most essential thing now, from the United States 
:viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army 
reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but 
.the desirable strength has not yet been reached. (78) 
But by November, the United States had already abandoned 
atte~pts to reach a compromise with Japan. After General Tojo 
became Prime Minister in October 1941, meaningful negotiations 
ceased. (79) Although Japan's decision for war was resolute by 
the fall of 1941, it is somewhat puzzling that Washington 
abandoned diplomatic efforts when a few more months of stalling 
i 
I 
mighy have given the United States sufficient military force to 
! 
oppo~e Japan, (80) On December 7, ,] apan' s attack on Pear I Harbor 
stunned the world. Hours later, the U.S. Air Force in the 
Philippines was destroyed by a second Japanese attack as it sat 
on the ground at Clark Field. A month later, the long expected 
invasion of the Netherlands East Indies began; by March of 1942, 
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Japan controlled Southeast Asia. 
I 
The outbreak of war in the Pacific triggered a radical 
transformation in U. S. policy in Southeast Asia. Overnight, I the 
I 
concerns that had shaped previous American diplomacy b1came 
irrelevant. The attempt to uphold the fit.atJJfi .9.!.cLQ had failed.1 The 
United States now concentrated all of its energies on defeating 
! 
the Japanese. Larger questions were subsumed to the immediate 
goal of winning the war. An 055 report on Indochina in 11942 
stated that 
our mission in this area is a military one. It is toi 
get the Japs out. We do not have to untangle the I 
complicated problems created by the war, including the: 
split between the pro-Vichy and anti-Vichy French, or 
to decide who is to hold Indochina after the war. (81) 
All non-military considerations were abandoned until after the 
war. 
The years leading up to World War II were confusing ones 
for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. For the first time, American 
interests ip the region expanded beyond the economic sphere to 
encompass military and strategic objectives as well. The in-
creased commitment to Southeast Asia resulted in bolder .U.S. 
policy in the region. In the 1920's, the 
diplomacy had been limited to the notion of the 
! 
tools of Ame1ican 
Open Door an4 the 
threat of retaliation against Royal Dutch Shell in the United 
States. In the State Department's eyes, American interests in 
Southeast Asia did not justify stronger action. By the 1930's, 
however, American concern for Southeast Asia had expanded far 




against Japan and ~ortified military bases in the Philippines in 
I 
hopes of stopping ~apanese expansion. No one could doubt that by 
'I 
1941 Southeast Asia: was more important to the United States than 
i 
ever before, but the region's new significance was not matched 
wi th greater clari'ty of thinking. The scale of American invol ve-
, 
ment had expanded', but the assumptions underlying U. S. policy 
remained unchanged .. 
Events outside of Southeast Asia continued to shape 
ruaerican policy. Am~rica's heightened concern for the region was 
due to events els~where in the world. It was not until Western 
I 
I 
Europe was threaten~d that the United States realized the mili-
tary significance of Southeast Asia. The American interest in the 
region was a product of the view that European economic and 
military security, particularly that of Great Britain, depended 
on continued trade with the colonies of Southeast Asia. Develop-
ments in Europe and Japan, not Southeast Asia, accounted for the 
area's new strategic and military value. Thus, the United States 
• continued to view Southeast Asia merely as a passive object of 
its policy, rather than an important concern in the actual 
decision-making process. U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was 
I 
I 
viewed in terms ~f its effect upon developments in Japan and 
Europe; the impact of American decisions on Southeast Asia itself 
was given little consideration. 
In general, American policy makers did not develop a 
olear set of objectives in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, U.S. 
diplomats sometimes inflated the importance of the region. In 
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1944, Secretary of State Hull informed President Roosevelt that 
[Indochina and the East Indies] are sources of products 
essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. 
They are potential markets for American exPorts. They 
lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacifiq 
Ocean and have important bearing on our security and 
the security of the Philippines. Their economic and 
political stability will be an important factor in the 
maintenance of peace in Asia. (82) 
At the same time that Washington proclaimed Southeast Asia's 
importance, however, there was little consideration of what the 
American role in the region should be. During the late 1930 ' s, 
U.S. policy still combined "cloudy, expansive aspirations with 
limited tangible interests, restricted means, and small readiness 
for sacrifice." (83) The coming of World War II did not bring 
with it an improved undertanding of the American role in South-
east Asia. After Pearl Harbor, long range considerations were 
completely subsumed by immediate military objectives. American 
strategy during the war rarely extended beyond the enemy's 
defeat. Thus, the United States had proclaimed an unprecedented 
interest in' Southeast Asia, but had made no progress towards 
defining its policy in the region. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Question of Colonialism. 
! 
With ~he end of the Second World War in August of 1945, 
United States Southeast Asian policy entered a new era. The 
pragmatic military concerns which had dominated American energies 
and resources ifor nearly four years faded from the scene. In both 
Europe and Asia the enemy lay vanquished; but the war had 
I 
extracted a brutal cost even from the victors, a price paid in 
devastated cities, ruined economies, and human carnage. Only the 
United States iemerged relatively unscathed. Every region of the 
world offered IAmerican leaders opportunities and challenges. The 
United States was unquestionably the world's greatest military 
and economic [power in 1945; American prestige around the globe 
was at its peak. Could Washington use this unchallenged power to 
• shape a world in its own image? 
The American vision for the postwar world was a grand 
one. The Unit~d States hoped to usher in a new era founded on an 
i 
I 
integrated w~rld order. Increasingly, US policy makers saw the 
entire world ~s a single, indivisible entity, In their eyes, the 
world could 'no longer be divided into spheres of influence and 
hostile strategic blocs; instead, lasting world peace depended on 
the creation of a unified, international order. The keystone of 
American universalism was the United Nations, long championed by 
i 
Franklin Roos~velt and finally established in 1945. The American 
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perception of the world as an indivisible whole had important 
consequences for U.S. foreign policy. Washington exPlicitly re-
cognized the connections binding policy in Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas. Decisions would no longer be made in a regional vacuum; 
instead, international developments often outweighed local con-
cerns in determining the United States path. Now, even more than 
before, American policy in Southeast Asia would be shaped by 
events outside of the region. 
At the center of the American vision was a unified 
international economic system based on free trade. In 1944, the 
Bretton Woods conference established two important organizations 
to further that goal. The World Bank provided capital for 
European reconstruction and development projects in emerging 
nations. The International Monetary Fund offered financing to 
correct trade deficits and stabilize troubled currencies. (1) 
American policy makers also worked to eliminate the preferential 
tariffs and other trade barriers that had plagued the world in 
the 1930's. The signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947 marked the formal realization of this goal. 
These financial programs were only one part of American 
aims. In addition, Washington sought to promote liberal demo-
cratic political institutions around the world. Like Wilson at 
Versailles, United States leaders again proclaimed the virtues of 
national self-determination and free elections. Agreements at 
Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam pledged the Allies to free elections, 
at least in name. Although Truman and others continued to search 
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for ways of undercutting t~e Soviet position in Eastern Europe, 
the Yalta agreements essent~allY accepted Soviet predominance in 
I 
the region. American calls ~or self-determination and free elec-
! 
tions were not, however,i limited to Eastern Europe. Amer'ica's 
goal of world democracy also clearly implied opposition to 
continued European colonial rule in Asia and Africa. Thus, 
decolonization became another central feature of the American 
postwar vision. 
: 
Before examining t~e situation American policy makers 
faced in Southeast Asia, it, is worth noting one important change. 
In 1945, the United States had greater military power and 
willingness to use it over~eas than at any previous time in its 
history. While this seems obvious, its consequences were im-
portant. For the first ~ime, the United States possessed the 
military power to enforce its policy in Southeast Asia. Washing-
ton would no longer concern itself with inability to back up its 
words with action. The appeasement and stalling tactics that had 
characterized Amerioan relations with Japan in the 1930's would 
no longer be neoessary. 
Most importantly, iincreased f...merican strength lent a new 
importance to every d .1. eC1ls1on. In earlier days, Washington's 
Southeast Asian policies often had litt.le oonsequence because the 
United States did not aot upon these decisions. Now, however, 
America would at least consider using its economic and military 
force to aohieve its objectives. This new propensity for action 
had important consequences. United States policy in Southeast 
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Asia had often been ill-defined and sporadically implemented. 
While this had been important in earlier years, it now took on a 
new significance. Lack of long range planning and clear objec-
tives would be far more serious now that the United States was 
prepared to wield its power in the region. 
United States Southeast Asian policy was at a great 
crossroads in 1945. The United States now had sufficient power to 
act upon its decisions. The issues of the past had become 
secondary considerations. Concern for unrestricted trade and 
American access to natural resources continued to play a role in 
American involvement in Southeast Asia; so, too, did the military 
and security concerns which arose in the 1930's. But these 
matters had lost their earlier importance. New issues, connected 
with larger considerations for the postwar international system, 
now occupied American thinking. 
The most important of these new concerns in Southeast 
Asia was the fate of the European colonial empires. The question 
• 
of colonialism also implied several lesser issues for American 
policy makers, including defining the United States position vis· 
a -vis the emerging nationalist movements in the region and 
responding to perceived communist threats. Much thought had been 
given to these matters before the end of the war. The postwar 
role of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia had been extensive-
ly discussed, but a firm policy was never adopted. The U.S. 
stance on the questions of colonialism and nationalism remained 
vague and contradictory in 1945. 
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Sinoe the proclamation of the ~tlantic Charter in 1941, 
I • 
decolonization had occupied a central pl~ce in United States war 
i 
objectives. The Charter proclaimed t~at the U.S. and Great 
! 
Britain would "respect the right of all. peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will' live" and wished to see 
"sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have 
been forcibly denied them." (2) Once the war began, however, the 
American position became more complic~ted. On the one hand, 
officials in Washington were adamantly dpposed to colonialism for 
a variety of moral and pragmatic reas;ons. On the other hand, 
however, the United States was alli~d with the very countries 
that would be hurt most by decolonization. Great Britain, France, 
and the Netherlands were understandably 'reluctant to part with 
their lucrative empires. Therefore, in the interests of smooth 
prosecution of the Allied war effort, firm decisions on the 
question of colonialism were avoided and postponed until after 
th e war. ( 3 ) • 
United States leaders had many different reasons for 
adopting anti-colonial policies. Opposition to European colonial 
I 
empires was rooted deep in the Americarl 
the first nation to thro~ 
past. The United States 
had been off the yoke of European 
colonial rule. The ideals of liberal democracy and the noble 
words of the Declaration of Independence moved many Americans to 
oppose colonialism. More recently, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen 
Points demonstrated a clearly anti-colonial position. Although 
Wilson had been largely discredited throughout the 1920's, his 
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ideas found renewed popularity during World War II. 
The American involvement in the Philippines offers a-
nother striking example of the U.S. position on the colonial 
question. In 1898, after a "splendid little war" with Spain, 
American leaders were sharply divided on what to do with the 
Philippines. Ardent expansionists like Theodore Roosevelt, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, and Albert Beveridge called for American annexation. 
Many older Americans, like former presidents Grover Cleveland and 
Benjamin Harrison, Senator George Frisbie Hoar, and a strange mix 
of private citizens (including Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie) 
opposed such a move as contrary to American democratic ideals. 
They argued that U.S. control of the Philippines would taint the 
nation's purity with the "greed and lust of empire". (4) 
Anti-colonialist arguments were swamped in a patriotic 
fervor, however, and the Philippines became an American protec-
torate. The debate on the Philippines did not die, however. By 
the 1930's, plagued by domestic woes and assailed by fresh doubts 
about colonialism, the United States was ready to rid itself of 
the islands. The 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act pledged Philippine 
independence in ten years. Nationalist leaders in other Asian 
colonies saw Tydings-McDuffie as a precedent for decolonization. 
The United States, long perceived as the friend and guardian of 
nationalist movements, ined even greater popularity among co-
lonial subjects. During the war, the ass reported that national-
ists in both Indochina and the Indies looked favorably upon 
the United States, largely due to its policy in the Philippines. 
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i 
(5) The colonial powers also took note of Tvdings-McDuffie; 
British, French, and Dutch officials 
i • 
expressed cbncern about the 
1 
i 
impact of Philippine independence on the nationr1ist movements 
within their colonies. (6) 
i 
By the 1940's, most Americans opposed i colonialism for 
ideological, economic, and strategic reasons. M~y U.S. leaders 
opposed the reestablishment of European colonial rule on essen-
tially moral grounds. These men, like Vice President Henry 
, 
I 
Wallace, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and younger 
I 
Foreign Service officers like Raymond Kennedy, Jofun Paton Davies, , 
i 
and Abbot Low Moffat thought continued imperiali$m contrary to 
American ideals of freedom and liberal democfacy. (7) Many 
official proclamations of the war years eloqmently expressed 
these beliefs. The most notable example was the Atlantic Charter. 
While the agreement set forth the shared objectives of the Anglo-
American alliance in the Atlantic, President Roosevelt was soon 
pressed to clarify the scope of the Charter. In response, high 
American officials including Roosevelt and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, on several occasions e:X"Plicitly stated that the 
Charter applied to the entire world and not judt the European 
i
l 
theat.er. (8) In 1941 Roosevelt told his son E~liott) "r can't 
I 
believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery and at 
, 
the same time not work to free people allover the world from a 
colonial policy." (9) Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was 
perhaps the most eloquent spokesman against colonialism. In early 
1942, he told the press that American victory, 
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i 
must bring in its train the liberation of al} peoples. 
Discrimination between peoples because of t~eir race, 
creed, or color must be abolished. The age of 1 imp erial-
ism is ended. The right of a people to the+r freedom 
must be recognized, as the civilized world fOng since 
recognized the right of an individual to hi~ personal 
freedom. (10) I 
But American anti:olonialism had more tangible motives as 
'" well; the United States policy was a perfect bl¢nd of idealism 
and self-interest. (11) Decolonization offered obyious economic 
advantages to the United States. As the prefere~tial economic 
ties which had bound the colonies to Europe dissolved, the United 
States, given its enormous postwar economic strength, was unique-
I 
ly suited to move into the colonial markets. This possibility was 
especially attractive to Americans looking for new markets abroad , 
as a guarantee against postwar recession. The f9rmer colonies 
would be able to absorb much of the American economy's surplus 
production. (12) 
Other economic concerns also factored into American op-
position to reinstatement of the colonial system. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull's anti-colonialism stemmed mostly from his 
disapproval of trade restrictions. Hull was determined to create 
an open world economy in the post-war era. The colonial system, 
with the tight economic bonds created betweenimetroPolis and 
i 
colony, represented a "glaring affront" to this vision of free 
trade. (13) The Imperial Preference System, a system of privi-
leged trade agreements between members of the British Common--
wealth, had incurred Hull's wrath throughout the 1930's. The war 
gave Hull the opportunity to sweep away the colonial system's 
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restrictive provisions. (14) I I" 
Some United States leaders based their oppositionlto 
I 
colonialism on American strategic aspirations. The State Depa~t-
I 
ment's Asian experts, like Kennedy, Davies, and Moffat wrre 
I 
concerned about the impact of renewed colonial rule on ~he 
American image abroad. They feared that an American failure! to 
i , 
oppose colonialism would severely damage U.S. prestige and po~u­
I 
I 
larity in Asia. (15) President Roosevelt also worried that; a 




would lead to i reduced American influence and commercial opppr-
tunities in the colonies. (18) Geopolitical strategic objecti~es 
I 
also played a role in U.S. anticolonialism. Many Americans 
I 
believed that postwar stability in Asia depended on the replape-
l 
ment of weak colonial governments with more reliable forms ! of 
rule. (17) Although policy makers disagreed as to whether the new 
system ought to take the form of international trusteeships I or 
outright iqdependence, American leaders generally believed that 
the establishment of independent nation states in Southeast Asia 
would enhance regional stability, (18) 
The American commitment to decolonization was not withput 
reservations, however. Despite a steady stream of bold pubaic 
I 
statements against colonialism, other concerns compelled the 
United States to compromise and weaken its stance. The most 
important of these counterweights was the opposition of the 
European colonial powers themselves. The governments of Great 
I 
Britain, France, and the Netherlands opposed, to varying degrees, 
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the dismantling of Itheir empires. Winston Churchill's famous 
I statement that he hid "not become the King's First Minister ~to 
preside over the liqJidation of the British Empire" demonstrated 
European sentiment. (~9) The colonial powers worked together to 
! 
block American efforts at decolonization. (20) 
The United States was extremely vulnerable to European 
I 
opposition. American· policy throughout the world depended on 
continued close ties with the European powers. Cordell Hull 
lamented that 
we could not ~res~ ... ~oo far with regard to the 
Southwest Pacif~c ln Vlew of the fact that we were 
seeking the closest possible cooperation with them in 
Europe. We could [not alienate them in the Orient and 
expect to work with them in Europe. (21) 
U.S. need for European cooperation was obvious during the war, 
but the colonial powers were utterly dependent on American 
military assistance. Thus, neither side wished to press the other 
too hard for concessions on the colonial question. Instead, the 
issue was postponed until after the war . 
At • the end of the war, however, the United States 
continued to need a close alliance with Western Europe. A healthy 
international economy ,depended on European recovery and American 
i 
I 
planners already sa, a strong and unified Europe as a bulwark 
I 
against Soviet rdtions. (22) While Europe still desperately 
needed American aid, in 1945, imminent military destruction no 
longer loomed on the horizon. Therefore, the colonial powers 
could take a more assertive position towards the United 
after the war, 
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The traditional European orientation of American foreign 
policy, which had become explicit with the Europe-first strategy 
during the war, also weakened American anti-colonialism. Offi-
cials in Washington focused their attention on a revitalized 
Europe; many of them saw the colonial empires as a necessary part 
of any rebuilding program. Depriving Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands of their colonial resources would retard European 
reconstruction. American policy, thus, consciously sacrificed its 
objectives in Southeast Asia to promote its European policy. (23) 
The colonial question remained a divisive, potentially alliance-
threatening issue. 
European leaders, especially Charles De Gaulle, ex-
ploited this weakness skillfully. In 1945, De Gaulle told the 
American ambassador in Paris, 
If the public here comes to realize that you are 
against us in Indochina there will be terrific disap-
pointment and nobody knows to what that will lead. We 
do not want to become Communist; we do not want to fall 
into the Russian orbit, but I hope that you do not push 
us into it. (24) . 
Some Americans shared such fears of communism. William J. Donovan 
of the ass warned Roosevelt that, "It is not in our national 
interest to lead a crusade for colonial independence. Our inte-
rest, in 1 a balance to Russia should lead us in the 
opposite direction." (25) Fear of communist advances in Southeast 
Asia also became a justification for returning the colonies to 
their European overlords. Foreign Service officers in Indochina 




1930's. As the chances for AmericJm-Soviet postwar cooperation 
worsened, these communist movements, even though they were in-
! 
digenous and largely free of S?viet control, became a grave 
concern in Washington. (26) i 
I 
i 
Postwar United States plans for Southeast Asia reflected ..., 
the conflicting goals of ant~ol?nialism and European revitali-
zation. Even those Americans in favor of decolonization con-
slstently favored a gradual process towards independence. Many of 
, 
, 
the staunchest American opponent$ of colonialism still believed 
that the people of Southeast Asia were not ready for immediate 
independence. (27) At times, policy makers envisioned interna-
tional trusteeships, overseen by the United Nations, for the 
former colonies. Such enlightened external control would guard 
against the risk of regional turmoil while guiding the new 
nations toward real autonomy. (2$) Others wanted decolonization 
to progress along the lines of,the Philippine model, with the 
colonies returned to their former rulers during a gradual in-
dependence process. On other occasions, however, Washington 
seemed ready to turn its back on the problem and allow the 
reestablishment of colonial 1 ' ru..L¢. The American answer to the 
: 
question of colonialism varied ! great,ly among the colonies of 
Southeast Asia. 
I 
American concern for t,he Netherlands East Indies was 
relatively mild. The Dutch colonial administration had a reputa-
tion for enlightened, progressive government. Social programs 
throughout the 1920's and '30's had significantly improved living 
, 
12~ 
conditions in the Indies. Dutch educational reforms and public 
health programs were frequently lauded. (29) As a result, Ameri-
can leaders. including President Roosevelt, were receptive to 
continued Dutch control of the Netherlands East Indies. (30) The 
Netherlands fostered this positive opinion by voluntarily intro-
ducing a plan for gradual Indonesian independence in 1941. The 
Dutch proposal, modified and reiterated throughout the war, was 
generally well received in the United States. (31) Roosevelt 
believed in the sincerity of Dutch intentions and informed Queen 
Wilhelmina in 1942 that the islands would be returned to the 
Dutch after the war. (32) Three years later, the State Department 
still anticipated the resumption of Dutch sovereignty in the 
Indies as soon as possible after the war ended. (33) 
In French Indochina, however, the situation was markedly 
different. Where American leaders viewed the Dutch as enlightened 
colonists, the French were considered the worst offenders in the 
system. (34) Roosevelt in particular was adamantly opposed to 
restored French rule in Indochina. 
France has had the country - thirty million inhabitants 
- for nearly one hundred years, and the people are 
worse off than they were at the beginning ... France has 
milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-
China are entitled to something better than that. (35) 
Americans saw French capitulation to the Japanese in Indochina as 
another justification for severing the colonial relationship. 
(36) 
Roosevelt proposed a postwar international trusteeship 






United States proposed a neutralized Indochina in which all 




United States, would 
I 
be 
guaranteed access to foodstuffs and raw materials. Japan rejected 
i 
this offer of "international neutralization"J:but Roosevelt re-
turned to the idea during the war. (37) The Indochinese trustee-
ship was closely linked with the President's vision of the United 
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China as the ":four 
policemen" of the postwar world. In Roosevelt',s plan, China and 
I 
the United States would share responsibility for Southeast Asia. 
The continued inability of Chiang Kai-shek! to solidify his 
control over China made the "four policemen" iidea increasingly 
untenable. The proposal for a trusteeship in Indochina suffered 
as a direct result. (38) Despite such setbaoks, Roosevelt ap-
parently still favored some form of trusteeship for Indochina at 
the time of his death. (39) 
! 
American refusal to allow the Free:French any role in 
wartime planning in the Indochina theater further showed the 
determination to exclude France from its former colonies. The 
United States repeatedly denied De Gaulle's requests for intro-
ducing French troops into Indochina. Great Britain, not sur-, 
prisingly. supported French efforts to recl~im its colony, In 
1944, Lord Mountbatten, Commander of the Southeast Asia Command 
prepared a mission using French t,roops in: Indochina without 
informing his American all ies. (40) 
Ultimately, of course, the French did return to Indochina 
while the independent nation of Indonesia was established in the 
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forme~ Netherlands East Indies in 1946. Since this was almost 
I 
exactlY the opposite of American intentions, it is worth examin-
I , 
ing why events transpired as they did. The most important reason 
I 
was the American emphasis on European matters. Although American 
power in 1945 was tremendous, it remained finite. The recon-
struction of Europe held absolute primacy in American eyes. This 
empha~is made the United States more vulnerable to pressures from 
the colonial powers. Indeed, the relative importance of France 
and the Netherlands to American plans in Europe was a key factor 
in tbe fate of their empires. Holland was never a prime concern 
of A~erican postwar policy makers. It was a small nation and 
I 
could offer relatively little resistance to the United States. 
French participation, on the other hand, was essential to a 
revitalized Western Europe. This gave De Gaulle and others 
tremendous leverage over the Americans; the French insisted that 
a strong, politically unified France would be impossible without 
a restored empire. Washington was relatively powerless against 
this argument. 
There were many other factors involved. The relative 
strengths of the Indonesian and Vietnamese communist parties were 
I 
a sec6nd important consideration. In American eyes, the national-
i st rhovement, Indochina was close 1 to communism. This 
concern predated the war by more than ten years. In 1932, a 
special report to the State Department on the colony was entitled 
"The Bolshevik Menace in Indoch (41) The Indonesian Commun-
ist Party (PKI), however, was far less prominent. While the PKI 
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had existed since 1920, it had not recovered its strength after 
being crushed following a failed uprising in 1926 and 1927. (42) 
The appeal of the most important Indonesian leaders, like Sukarno 
and Hatta, was based on nationalist considerations, rather than 
any ideological platform like Marxism. Therefore, the Indonesian 
nationalists did not appear as threatening to American interests 
as their Indochinese counterparts. The determination to stop 
communism is another reason for American toleration of renewed 
French control. 
As noted earlier, Chiang Kai-shek's failure to build a 
unified China was also a factor. With the crumbling of Chiang's 
regime, the United States was left alone in Asia and was forced 
to turn to the European powers for support. (43) Thus, Washing-
ton's stand against colonialism had to be tempered by the 
realization that without European cooperation, Americans "would 
wind up having to find solutions in Asia all alone, for they 
would have alienated their European allies while China could do , 
no more than thrash about." (44) 
The relative strength of the Indonesian and Indochinese 
nationalist movements played an important role. For the most 
part, the Indonesian nationalists were better prepared than their 
counterparts in Indochina. Although the prewar Dutch administra-
tion had suppressed the Indonesian nationalists, political re-
forms in the 1920's had introduced at least a minimal level of 
native participation in colonial government. (45) The Japanese 
occupation provided an important boost to Indonesian nationalism. 
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! 
In an effort to wim popular approval, the Japanese freed Sukarno 
I 
and other imprisoned leaders and allowed native Indonesians 
enhanced politicaJ responsibility. The Japanese occupiers also 
established Bahas~ Indonesia as the official national language. 
This decision facilitated the development of a unified national-
ist front, alleviating earlier lingusitic divisions within the 
movement. Japan aRso established PETA, a civilian defense corps 
which provided Indonesians with weapons and training. The experi-
I 
ence gained in PETA proved invaluable in resisting Dutch forces 
after the war. {46~ 
During the: war, ass analysts were aware of the Indonesian 
nationalist movement's strength, and warned of the possible 
consequences of American aid to Dutch forces seeking to reimpose 
control. One ass report from early in the war warned that "the 
United States would be eA~remely ill-advised to take any part in 
an attempt to restore the Dutch empire." (47) A report from 1945 
expressed the same conclusion in evasive language . 
• 
The presence or absence of United States personnel 
the reconquest of the Netherlands East Indies] 
[in 
will 
local then be given a certain interpretation by the 
population and influence its future attitude towards 
the United St~tes. (48) 
I 
Nati isb forces in Indochina had not progress 
I 
so 
far. The Unit,ed States was relat ly un about the nation-
a1 ist movement in Indochina. Al though .there was some cooperation 
between All forces, particularly OSS, and t,be Viet Minh 
during the war, Americans were unsure of the strength and 
importance of these groups. (49) In the absence of information, 
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the United States seems to have underestimated the strength of 
the nationalist movement in Indochina. 
The final explanation for the postwar settlement in 
Southeast Asia can be found in French and Dutch attitudes. De 
Gaulle's France was intensely committed to the restoration of the 
empire. As a consequence, the French were prepared to use force 
in suppressing any nationalist insurgents. In the Netherlands, 
however, opinion was divided. At the end of the war, the Dutch 
favored renewed control of the East Indies, but with greater 
autonomy and an enhanced position for the Indies within the Dutch 
empire. The Netherlands did not expect Indonesian resistance to 
their return. Wartime intelligence reports indicated that the 
population of the Indies retained considerable popular support 
for Netherlands rule. (50) The Dutch anticipated that the Indo-
nesians would cooperate in the reestablishment of Dutch rule even 
~ 
if the return was not backed up with a large military force. (51) 
Thus, when Ipdonesians resisted the return of Dutch forces, the 
Netherlands government was taken by surprise; the Dutch were 
unprepared to wage a prolonged struggle for control of the 
islands. 
American policy in Southeast Asia in 1945 was very 
different from what it had been just four years earlier. The 
scope of U.S. interests in the region had once again widened 
significant While the economic issues that had dominated the 
1920's and the military and security considerations of the prewar 
years carried over after 1945, their importance was greatly 
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I 
reduced. Larger ide~logical issues, especially colonialism and - I anticommunism, 
"" importance of 





concerns was not limited to Southeast -Asia; indeed, colonialism and anticommunism were at the 
! 1\ 
center of 
American postwar poli¢y deliberations throughout the world. By 
1945, then, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was no longer 
determined by peripheral concerns; now, American activities in 
I 
; 
the region were shaped by the most important issues of the day. 
; 
Despite the widened scope of U,S, interests in Southeast 
Asia, events outside 6f the region continued to shape American 
policy. Washington's· commitment to decolonization had been ex-
plicit and heartfelt. There is no doubt that the prospect of 
renewed French rule in Indochina was repulsive to many State 
Department officials: At least some Americans genuinely en-
visioned greater democracy and freedom for the people of South-
east Asia. Ultimately, however, these goals were sacrificed to 
further U.S. objectives in Europe. The emphasis on postwar 
European recovery handcuffed American policy in Southeast ia. 
Desire for cooperation in Europe prevented the United States from 
mounting effective opposition to the reimposition of French rule 
I 
i 
in Indochina. i 
j 
The implications of this decision were ing. 
, 
American prestige in Southeast Asia was dealt a severe blow. 
Nationalist 1 had expected the Un States honor the 
intentions of the Atlantic Charter. In August 1945, Mohammed 
Ratta's "Indonesian Aims and Ideals" stated that the Charter 
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carried "the solemn assurance of the Big Powers tha.t they 
'recognize the right of all peoples to live under a government of 
their own choice. , .. (52) When the U.S. failed to follow through 
on this commitment, Hatta and nationalists throughout Southeast 
Asia felt betrayed. 
The fact that the United States did not actively partici-
pate in either the French reconquest of Indochina or the unsuc-
cessful Dutch attempt to return to the East Indies made little 
difference in the nationalists' eyes. Because America was indis-
putably the world's preeminent power, Washington's failure to 
oppose recolonization was tantamount to support of that effort. 
Nor can it be argued that State Department officials at the time 
were unaware of these facts. ass reports from both Indochina and 
the East Indies had repeatedly cautioned that American support of 
the colonial powers would severely harm U.S. credibility in the 
region. The decision to abandon decolonization despite this 
knowledge revealed a continued lack of long range vision on the 
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EPILOGUE 




matically during the first half of the twentieth century. The 
I 
American presence was no longer limited to the activities of a 
few missionaries and spice traders. The U.S. economic invQlvement 
had grown extensively; exports to Southeast Asia had risen 
dramatically and both American oil and rubber companie~ owned 
large holdings in the region. World War II had given 
States a military awareness of Southeast Asia for the 
! 





Although the U.S. withdrew its forces following Japan's [defeat, 
the American naval presence in Southeast Asia was still strongly 
felt. By 1945, the thorny issues of colonialism and anticclmmunism 
occupied American policy makers. 
At first glance, it would appear that U.S. inte~ests in 
Southeast Asia had undergone a complete transformation. American 
diplomacy started with a few, relatively minor, economic con-
cerns. Gradually, these Open Door aspirations expanded to ,include 
I 
security interests as well. But the process did not sto~ there. 
After World War II, American interests in Southeast Asia IWidened 
further to encompass broader foreign policy objectives as well. 
While the changes that took place between 1900 and 1945 were 
i ly significant, they unfolded only very gradual 
The American commitment to Southeast Asia passed ,through 




preceding one. ~he expansion of U.S. interests never entailed a 
I 
I 
renunciation of ~arlier goals. When American diplomacy moved into 
I 
a new era, its rrevious objectives were not abandoned. Instead, 
I 
each era simply ~dded one more concern to the interests that had 
already accumulated. The progression is clear. The United States 
first viewed Sbutheast Asia as a market for American exports. 
i 
When oil diplomacy rose to prominence in the early 1920's, the 
United States ~id not relinquish its interest in promoting 
exports to Southeast Asia; concern for equal access to raw 
materials was combined with previous objectives. Similarly, the 
rise of military, and security concerns in the 1930's did not mark 
I 
the end of American economic interests in Southeast Asia. Eco-
nomic goals continued to play an important role in U.S. policy. 
Even when the question of colonialism achieved center stage in 
1945, more traditional American concerns persisted. Southeast 
Asian natural re$ources, in particular Indonesian oil, remained 
central to American interests even after World War II, 
Oil diplomacy enjoyed a mini-resurgence in 1945 for 
essentially the same reasons that it had arisen following the 
First World War. lance again, the United States feared that its 
I 
domestic oil res~rves were dwindl . A new generation of State 
I 
Department icials proclaimed the importance of oil to 
American economy and national defense. Like their counterparts a 
quarter oentury earlier, they led for vigorous government 
support of American oil firms ( 1 ) 
Thus, while American interests in Southeast Asia expanded 
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between 1900 and 1945, the process was a gradual one. Significant 
continuities linked U.S. policy in 1945 with that of previous 
eras. Because of the transformation's evolutionary pace, American 
diplomats never confronted a clear break with past U.S. policies. 
This meant that the underlying assumptions of American policy in 
Southeast Asia, established during the 1920's, went unchallenged 
in later years. The backdrop against which the United States 
formed its policies in Southeast Asia was still the same in 1945 
as it had been twenty-five years earlier. The tremendous expan-
sion of the objectives of American involvement in Southeast Asia 
between the wars was not combined with a broadening of the 
context within which policy decisions were made. 
At the outset, American diplomacy in Southeast Asia 
included little concern for the impact of U.S. policy on the 
region itself. American involvement was limited to a few specific 
objectives, shaped by events outside of Southeast Asia. U.S. 
considerations rarely extended beyond the specific goals of the 
moment to encompass longterm interests in the area, The oil 
diplomacy of the 1920's marked the first instance of prolonged 
official U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Washington's oil 
policies were shaped by concerns and events within the United 
. Risi demand oil coupled with depletion of domestic 
reserves spurred the State Department into active support for 
American oil firms abroad. The Netherlands East Indies were 
important only insofar as they offered a solution to the domestic 
oil crisis. When that crisis passed, it was perfectly natural 
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although the situation 
in the Indies remained unc~anged. The rise of American oil 
diplomacy had involved little bonsideration of the situation in 
Southeast Asia. Nor had it looked beyond the immediate concern of 
Jersey Standard's success. Thub, it is not surprising that the 
eventual decline of oil diplomacy also included little concern 
for either events in the r6gion or larger American interests. 
American diplomats of the 1920rs should not be faulted for this 
narrow outlook. Given the restricted nature of American ob-
jectives, it was completely re~sonable that the context in which 
I 
policy decisions were made remained limited. The problem would 
come, however, when this decision making context failed to expand 
in the 1930's and '40's in ponjuction with the enlargement of 
U.S. objectives in Southeast A~ia. 
In 1945, American policy decisions were still considered 
within the limited conteA~ of u.s. goals from the 1920's. While 
this narrow outlook had been adequate for the purposes of 
• 
American oil diplomacy, it was not sufficient for the wider 
objecti ves of 1945. The United Stat.es could no longer afford to 
create its policies without relference to events within Southeast 
! 
Asia and longterm American int~rests in the 
I 
ion. The expansion 
of American objectives led an increased significance for all 
U.S. policy decisions; the impact of these decisions on America 
and Southeast ia alike had increased. In the 1920's, oil 
diplomacy bad involved little commitment of American resources. 
The prime ingredient in the St~te Department's case, Open Door 
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rhetoric, was both cheap and plentiful in Washington. In ad4i-
tion, U.S. oil diplomacy had little impact on Southeast Asia 
itself. It made no difference in the future of the Netherlands 
East Indies whether its oil reserves were developed by Royal 
Dutch Shell or Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
By 1945, however, American policy decisions in Southeast 
Asia had attained far greater significance. The U.S. position on 
colonialism obviously had a profound impact on Southeast Asia. 
The American failure to oppose the reimposition of European rule 
thwarted the colonies' ambitions of independence. More impor-
tantly from the American perspective, Washington's ambiguous 
stance on the colonial question severely damaged longterm U.S. 
interests in Southeast Asia. America's retreat on the question of 
colonialism served its short term interests in Europe. Washing-
ton's acquiesence to French imperial ambitions paved the way to 
smoother cooperation and faster reconstruction. But the resulting 
blow to Amer.ican prestige in Southeast Asia had far more enduring 
consequences. Had the United States offered stronger resistance 
to the colonial powers in 1945, the chances for a postwar liberal 
democratic order in Southeast Asia would have been greatly 
improved. The impact of such a course action on European 
recovery would have been minimal. Had the colonies of Southeast 
Asia been placed under international trusteeship in 1945, Euro-
pean reconst.ruction would not have been delayed significantly. 
The American decision not to force decolonization was rooted in 
assumptions inherited from past United States diplomacy in South-
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i 
east Asia. The narrow outlook of U.S. pdlicy decisions} which had 
arisen during the oil diplomacy of the 1i920'S, would continue 'to 
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